Introduction

The arrival of some 80 000 irregular migrants in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta on 30 July 2026 has raised important issues about the EU's external border policy. How was this unexpected surge able to take place? What role did disinformation on social media play and who was behind it? What does it say about the EU's cooperation on migration with third countries? The crisis has also served to highlight EU countries' different views on how irregular migration should be tackled; EU countries such as Italy have claimed the Spanish government's plans to regularise irregular migrants in the country is serving as a significant pull factor. The European Parliament is closely following developments.

Background

Ceuta and Melilla are two Spanish autonomous cities located on the northern coast of Africa. They occupy a unique position within the European Union and the Schengen area, as they represent the EU's only land borders with Africa. Spain signed the Schengen Agreement in 1991, which entered into force in 1995. As such, Ceuta and Melilla operate under a specific Schengen regime with checks carried out on exit by sea or air, the only two routes available.

The two enclaves came under the spotlight on 30 July 2026, when a massive migration incident took place with an estimated 80 000 people breaching the border from Morocco into Ceuta. At least 72 people died, including many who drowned while trying to swim from Morocco to Ceuta and others who were crushed while trying to climb a border barrier, according to Spanish authorities. By 2 August, most who crossed into Ceuta had returned to Morocco.

There have been similar incidents in the past. At the end of September 2005, hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants executed coordinated, simultaneous attempts to scale the fences at both Ceuta and Melilla. The incidents resulted in several deaths and prompted Spain to significantly upgrade the border infrastructure, raising the fences to their current 6‑metre height and adding razor wire. In February 2014, at least 14 migrants drowned off the coast of Ceuta while attempting to swim around the El Tarajal breakwater to reach Spanish territory. However, prior to 2026 the largest single crossing on record took place in May 2021. Roughly 8 000 to 10 000 people – including an estimated 1 500 unaccompanied minors – entered Ceuta in two days, either by passing the fences, by swimming or by walking around the coastal breakwaters after Moroccan security forces notably stood down. In June 2022, around 2 000 migrants – mainly from Sudan – attempted to storm a border crossing turnstile into Melilla. At least 23 people died.

Announced in January 2026, Spain is implementing an extraordinary regularisation procedure granting legal status to migrants currently living in the country without valid residence permits who fulfil the eligibility criteria. In addition, a Supreme Court ruling of 29 June 2026 bolsters due process protections by ending expedited summary pushbacks and immediate deportations for maritime arrivals in Ceuta and Melilla.The Spanish Supreme Court ruling, which was published on 8 July 2026, addressed the legality of rechazo en frontera (summary pushbacks or immediate deportations). In particular, the ruling concerned the scope of the special rechazo en frontera regime under Additional Provision 10 of Organic Law 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain (LOEX) in the context of irregular entry at the borders with Ceuta and Melilla. It stated that the authorities cannot summarily deport migrants arriving by sea without due process, given that they did not cross the physical border infrastructure referenced in Spanish law.

In the past, Spanish security forces used this mechanism to proceed to immediate deportations of migrants caught passing the physical perimeter fences around Ceuta and Melilla without processing them. The Supreme Court ruled that this mechanism strictly applies to physical land barriers. As the sea does not have a physical containment structure, authorities cannot summarily push back migrants who arrive by swimming around border breakwaters such as Tarajal. Instead, the authorities are required to follow standard administrative processing, which allows for a maximum 72-hour temporary detention period to verify identities and initiate formal deportation procedures.

The above-mentioned developments, together with the events of July 2026, have led to mixed reactions from other EU countries.In early August 2026, Italy temporarily and unilaterally suspended its open-border travel with Spain, citing security concerns and a need to defend European borders.

A joint letter signed by 22 European Heads of State or Government was addressed to European Council President António Costa, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin, currently holding the Council Presidency. The action was initiated by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. The signatories called for an immediate and coordinated European response. In addition, the letter called on the Council Presidency to convene an extraordinary videoconference of home affairs ministers, in order to assess the situation and discuss additional support for Spain, as well as further measures to protect the EU's external borders.

Thus, on 4 August 2026, the Irish Council Presidency held an extraordinary meeting by videoconference, where home affairs ministers addressed recent developments in Ceuta, with Member States expressing strong solidarity with Spain and commending its swift response. The Spanish authorities and the Commission stressed that the vast majority of those who crossed illegally h ad already been returned and that there was no onward movement to mainland Spain or other EU Member States. Chaired by Irish Minister Jim O'Callaghan, the Council emphasised a united European approach to protecting external borders by fighting smuggling networks, reinforcing returns, and deepening partnerships with third countries. Finally, ministers highlighted the need for better shared situational awareness – such as social media monitoring and early-warning systems – and stressed the importance of coordinated communication to counter foreign information manipulation during crises.

During a press briefing in Brussels following the videoconference of EU home affairs ministers, Commissioner Magnus Brunner characterised the mass crossings as a test of the EU's resilience and a major test for the EU's external border, but confirmed that the borders had held and the Schengen area remained unaffected.

On 24 August, Spain applied for emergency financial aid from the EU to help increase reception capacity in Ceuta and strengthen the security infrastructure at the enclave's border with Morocco. A few days after that, it also requested support from three EU agencies. In the meantime, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has stated that there has been no evidence of Morocco being linked to the mass crossing to Ceuta, blaming social media disinformation for triggering the unprecedented crisis and stressing that the investigation is still ongoing.

On 1 September 2026, the Spanish government announced it was allocating €309 million to boost security services and reception facilities in Ceuta and to support its local economy.

European Commission

In a letter to Sánchez, von der Leyen emphasised that securing the EU's external borders is a 'shared European responsibility'. She called for a united response to strengthen vulnerable border points, advocating for heightened surveillance and the implementation of physical barriers where necessary. Despite the scale of the breach, von der Leyen praised Sánchez for his rapid and effective management of the crisis, highlighting that the vast majority of the estimated 50 000 migrants had already been returned to Morocco.

Following the incident , von der Leyen proposed a five-point plan to strengthen Europe's borders. She stressed that the EU should focus on: strengthening cooperation with third countries to prevent migration; strengthening the Union's external borders; implementing early warning systems; dismantling smuggling networks; and boosting the returns of people with no right to stay. EU home affairs ministers endorsed the strategy during their videoconference meeting.

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum went into effect on 12 June 2026. In December 2025, the Council and European Parliament agreed on the EU list of safe countries of origin.The list includes: Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo*,¹ Morocco, and Tunisia, plus EU accession candidates. Thus, Moroccan nationals claiming asylum in the EU face accelerated border procedures and a presumption of non-eligibility for refugee status. Under the Screening Regulation, national authorities in Ceuta have a maximum of seven days to complete a strict pre-entry screening for everyone apprehended. This includes identity verification, security checks, and health/vulnerability assessments. The Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR) mandates that the claims of nationals with low recognition rates – such as Morocco – be processed under an accelerated border procedure. The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) introduced a 'mandatory but flexible' solidarity mechanism, which requires other EU Member States to contribute, either by relocating migrants to their own territory, or by paying financial contributions to support border management. The Eurodac Regulation legally requires national authorities to collect fingerprints, facial images and passport data for all irregular arrivals. The Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation allows EU Member States facing extraordinary migration surges or instrumentalised border crises to temporarily derogate from standard asylum rules by extending registration deadlines and border detention times.

On 3 September 2026, the Commission confirmed that Spain had requested a permanent presence for Frontex in Ceuta, a request that is currently being assessed as a priority. Before finalising the assessment, the Spanish government will need to respond to clarifications requested by the Commission. However, the Commission highlighted that it immediately offered extra financial and agency support through Frontex and Europol to the Spanish authorities following the mass border crossings at the end of July.

Schengen

Although Spain is part of the Schengen area, special rules apply to Ceuta and Melilla, meaning that anyone travelling from these two cities to the rest of Spain by sea or air are still subject to checks. This includes irregular migrants residing in Ceuta and Melilla, who continue to face these barriers when attempting to travel to the rest of Spain and the EU.

The situation in Ceuta led to Italy calling for Spain to be suspended from Schengen on 30 July 2026. However, EU legislation does not allow for that possibility, as pointed out by Josep Borrell, former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs. EU countries do, though, have the option to introduce temporary border checks in specific circumstances. The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 – lays down the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, including the conditions under which Schengen states may temporarily reintroduce checks at internal borders.

The SBC has been amended several times. The latest amendment (Regulation (EU) 2024/1717, in force since July 2024) revised the framework for the reintroduction of internal border controls, specifying new deadlines and additional monitoring and reporting requirements. The revision also clarifies the measures that may be used as an alternative to border controls (such as police checks) and introduces a new procedure for the swift transfer between Member States of third-country nationals apprehended in border areas.

As of 3 September 2026, 10 Schengen states continue to maintain checks at one or more sections of their internal borders to address migration and security threats. Although Italy had announced the temporary reintroduction of border controls in June 2026, which will be valid until 18 December 2026, the country decided to launch a new notification as a result of what was happening in Ceuta. Explaining the reasons for and scope of this new notification, Italy said:

Threat to public policy, internal security, and the management of migration flows due to recent events in the Spanish autonomous city of Ceuta, resulting from large-scale irregular entries of third-country nationals, with a risk of secondary movements within the Schengen area; internal air and sea borders with Spain.

The initial notification was valid until 1 September 2026, but Italy extended it until 16 September; none of the other Schengen countries with temporary border checks in place have cited the situation in Ceuta . On 7 August 2026, the Spanish government announced that it would start checking travellers arriving in the country from Italy. It later extended these checks after Italy announced that it would continue its checks for another 15 days.

In line with Article 27(2) of SBC, where border control at internal borders has been in place for six months in accordance with Article 25a(5), the Member State concerned shall carry out a risk assessment. Article 27(5) allows Member States to refrain from providing all the information in cases justified on public security grounds, considering the confidentiality of ongoing investigations. Where necessary and in accordance with national law, Member States may decide to classify all or part of the notified information, in particular the risk assessments.

According to Article 27a(3) of SBC, following receipt of notifications submitted in relation to a prolongation of border control at the internal border under Article 25a(4) which leads to the continuation of border control at internal borders for 12 months in total, the Commission shall issue an opinion on the necessity and proportionality of such border control. There is no publicly available information about the Commission's opinions on the reintroduction of internal border control. (The only available Commission opinion was issued in October 2015, which positively assessed the necessity and proportionality of internal border controls reintroduced by Germany and Austria in 2015.)²

Regularisation

The Spanish government's plans for regularisation of irregular migrants in 2026 has been cited as one of the causes for the incident in Ceuta by opposition parties as well as a number of EU countries. In particular, in January 2026, Spain's government announced its intention to r egularise undocumented migrants that have lived in the country for at least five months before 31 December 2025. Once they have been issued their residency permits, these foreign nationals would be able to travel without a visa to other Schengen countries for short stays of up to 90 days in any 180-day period.

The Spanish government launched the regularisation through a royal decree with no parliamentary involvement. The migrants concerned could receive a provisional one-year residence and work permit provided they can prove they lived in the country for at least five months before 31 December 2025 and have no criminal record. The regularisation will not confer Spanish nationality on those taking part; it is only for a one-year residence and work permit. Undocumented migrants had until 30 June 2026 to apply for the regularisation; a total of 1 174 978 applications were received.

People who entered Ceuta without permission on 30 July or after will not be eligible for the regularisation, because they missed the deadline and do not meet the criteria, such as having lived in Spain for at least five months prior to 31 December 2025.

The announcement led to Spanish opposition party Partido Popular to ask the European Commission to review whether this complies with the EU's migration policy. Following the events in Ceuta on 30 July, Partido Popular and another opposition party, Vox, claimed the crisis had been caused by the government's regularisation scheme.

The regularisation plans were also criticised by several Heads of State or Ggovernment of other Member States, who were concerned about the impact the regularisation could have on their country.

Italian foreign minister Antonio Tajani wrote on X (translated from Italian using Google Translate):

The images emerging from Ceuta demonstrate how the Madrid government's decision to grant Spanish, and therefore European, citizenship to over 500 000 irregular immigrants is profoundly flawed and encourages human trafficking.

The letter signed by the Heads of State or Government of 22 EU countries and sent on 1 August 2026, mentioned above, also referred to regularisation schemes as a pull factor for irregular migrants:

We recognise that the recent ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court has been used to trigger this attack and abuse our migration and asylum system. At the same time, we have a duty to effectively deter and relentlessly combat illegal migration, by coordinating our action, strengthening our external borders and addressing all policies that can serve as pull factors, such as the regularization of very large number of irregular migrants.

According to a 2009 Regine study, an estimated 5.5-6 million people were regularised in 24 EU countries between 1996 and 2008. Italy has also had several regularisations in recent decades, as mentioned in a 2014 paper by Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Francesca Zampagni.

In Spain, there have been nine regularisation initiatives since the late 1970s. This includes regularisations by the Partido Popular-led government in 2000 and 2001, which covered just over 500 000 undocumented migrants.

The 2008 Returns Directive established the power of Member States to grant a residence permit to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory as an exception to the general rule of issuing a return decision to any such third-country national staying illegally. The European Commission proposed a Return Regulation to replace the 2008 directive. The text agreed by negotiators of the European Parliament and Council does not refer to regularisations. Although it was approved by Parliament, the legislation has still to be formally adopted by the Council before it can enter into force.

In 2024, a number of MEPs from the Patriots for Europe group submitted a question to the European Commission about the regularisation of irregular migrants in Spain and its consequences for the EU. In response, Magnus Brunner, the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, said: 'Decisions and policies to regularise illegally staying third-country nationals, including the granting of residence permits, fall under the responsibility of Member States. The Commission has no competence on this matter.' However, he added that Member States needed to ensure that these decisions do not put at risk the integrity of the EU common area without internal border controls and to duly consider potential migratory and security implications.

In a 2008 note on the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, the Council said it agreed to use only case-by-case regularisations, rather than generalised regularisations, under national law, for humanitarian or economic reasons.

Frontex

Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, can assist EU countries with border management at their request. As part of Operation Minerva, Frontex has been supporting Spanish border guards with travellers arriving from Morocco in the ports of Algeciras, Tarifa and Ceuta every summer since 2022. This involves checking people, documents and vehicles. The 2026 operation started in June and continued until 2 September. It included 137 specialists from 15 different countries who helped the Spanish National Police in their work.

Following the incident in Ceuta, the European Commission confirmed on 6 August that it had received a first-needs assessment from Spain. The next step would be for the country to submit a formal application to the Commission, based on which it could offer additional support, ranging from equipment and services for border management to humanitarian and medical assistance. Some of this support could be offered through Frontex. The border management agency could also provide Spain with operational and technical support for returning migrants.

However, Frontex can only offer assistance, as the Spanish authorities remain in charge of border controls in Ceuta. Support from Frontex can also only be offered at the request and with the approval of the Member State involved.

On 28 August 2026, the Spanish government formally submitted a request to the European Commission for support from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) in Ceuta. For Frontex, this includes an extension of Operation Minerva, as well as 10 additional officers. Spain has also asked that Frontex helps with returns.

Smuggling and disinformation

According to arriving migrants' testimonies, fake news had spread rapidly across Moroccan social media networks. These posts falsely claimed that the normally strictly guarded borders had been opened and that anyone who entered Ceuta would easily receive asylum or authorisation to travel to mainland Spain. Furthermore, according to the Spanish newspaper El Español , CCTV footage captured by the Civil Guard reportedly identified Moroccan intelligence agents in plain clothes among the groups of migrants. Investigators believe that some of these agents carried out coordination and surveillance activities while Moroccan nationals crossed into Ceuta. Since then, Spain's Civil Guard produced a six-page report examining the possibility of another mass migrant crossing into Ceuta on 15 August and comparing coverage from both Spanish and Moroccan media. Investigators also examined Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram groups with memberships of about 400 000 people. Based on the open-source material reviewed, the Civil Guard stated that it was unable to identify those responsible for promoting the campaign, while it had found no evidence linking it to the Moroccan government, Moroccan security services, or any specific migrant-smuggling network.

Henna Virkkunen, the European Commission Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, has taken a firm stance, demanding that social media companies take responsibility for their role in the border emergency. Thus, Virkkunen called Meta and TikTok for meetings, in order to cooperate on ways to eliminate digital channels that they claimed were used by people smugglers to encourage many of those who crossed into Ceuta. In particular, the EU is asking these platforms to increase real-time monitoring of their networks, drastically strengthen their cooperation with independent fact-checkers, and swiftly remove content that facilitates human smuggling. Meta confirmed it has a dedicated team monitoring the Ceuta situation in real time to remove content that goes against their policies, including content facilitating human smuggling. TikTok announced that it had established a specific task force and was deploying advanced technology to detect and remove exploitative schemes from its network.

According to a report by the intelligence firm Golden Owl, the Ceuta incident was a deliberately organised operation driven by a branded digital campaign known as the 'Karyaj assault', rather than a spontaneous event. The mobilisation relied on a resilient, three-layered, decentralised network that utilised public broadcast pages and private micro-recruiters to 'cast' specific, quota-based crossing cells without a vulnerable central command. This sophisticated online coordination translated into tactical execution on the ground, utilising simultaneous mass swimming and coordinated fence approaches. The campaign's nationwide reach drew migrants from as far away as Casablanca, proving that the unprecedented border crossings were the result of heavily directed, pre-planned digital mobilisation.

Despite the severity of the online rumours, the European Commission confirmed that no Member State has officially triggered the formal 'crisis mechanism' under the Digital Services Act (DSA) regarding the Ceuta incident. However, the EU is now actively pushing to enhance its own capacity to track misinformation trends by working more closely with Europol and other security agencies.

European Parliament

Back in June 2021, the European Parliament had adopted a resolution on the breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child by the Moroccan authorities. The Parliament rejected Morocco's use of border control and migration, and unaccompanied minors in particular, as political pressure against a Member State of the EU and formally reiterated that Ceuta is an external border of the EU, expressing full solidarity with the citizens of Ceuta and applauding the response of the Spanish authorities and NGOs.

In a statement issued on 31 July 2026, Javier Zarzalejos, Chair of the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), condemned the mass migrant arrivals in Ceuta as an 'absolutely unacceptable' breach of both Spain's and the EU's external borders. He argued that the crisis cannot be blamed solely on criminal smuggling networks, and demanded a firm, effective European response. He called on all Member States, including Spain, to fully implement the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, utilise Frontex effectively, and ensure the rapid return of those without a legal right to stay. Furthermore, he announced that the LIBE committee would hold a debate in September to scrutinise both the mass entry into Ceuta and the Spanish government's large-scale migrant regularisation policy.

The LIBE committee held an extraordinary meeting on 6 August 2026 to address the migrant crossings in Ceuta. The Mayor-President of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas Lara, delivered an assessment of the situation. He pleaded for direct intervention from European institutions and agencies, demanding a structural response to the chronic pressure Ceuta faces as Europe's land border in Africa. Furthermore, he called for immediate European solidarity, including mandatory relocation quotas among EU Member States, extraordinary financial resources, and physical reinforcements for border security infrastructure. Commissioner Brunner addressed the EU's approach to border management, while focusing on the need to secure external borders. On 8 September, LIBE committee Chair Javier Zarzalejos held a press conference on the situation in Ceuta, together with the Mayor-President of Ceuta.

Cooperation with third countries: Morocco

Following the crisis, the European Union has moved towards a strategy of deepening its partnership with Morocco while boosting financial support. To maintain cooperation on migration management, the European Commission announced further financial support for Morocco. During their emergency meeting on 4 August, EU home affairs ministers emphasised that building deeper partnerships with key third countries such as Morocco remains the cornerstone of Europe's external border strategy.

The Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation was signed by Morocco and Spain in 1991. In 1992, Spain and Morocco signed their first readmission agreement. In February 2023, the European Commission announced the EU action plan for the western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, outlining a targeted operational strategy to address irregular migration. The action plan: prioritises dismantling human smuggling networks by implementing the Anti-Smuggling Operational Partnership (ASOP) with Morocco; aims to strengthen border control by fostering increased bilateral cooperation between Morocco and EU agencies; aims to reinforce effective returns to partner countries to reduce irregular flows, through improved practical cooperation with Morocco on readmission; addresses the need for legal migration routes to deter irregular journeys and thus calls for the operationalisation of a Talent Partnership with Morocco. Moreover, in the context of the cooperation programmes with Morocco, a €152 million comprehensive programme on migration was launched to strengthen Morocco's border management actions in the fight against smuggling networks – the National Strategy of Morocco on Immigration and Asylum – as well as the voluntary return to and reintegration of migrants in their countries of origin, in accordance with international standards on human rights. In addition, Spain directly finances Moroccan border security. For instance, at the beginning of 2025, Spain allocated €2.5 million to Morocco for border surveillance equipment and vehicles.

Back in October 2011, the EU officially launched 'Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security' with both Tunisia and Morocco. Driven by the new geopolitical realities and dialogues at the time, the EU's existing Global Approach to Migration (GAM) was revised. Thus, in November 2011, GAM was formally adopted as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

The 2013 Mobility Partnership aimed to balance security with legal pathways, as it offered the lifting of visa restrictions for certain Moroccan professionals and students. In exchange, Morocco would contribute by tightening border controls, developing a domestic asylum system, and negotiating a formal EU Readmission Agreement. Moreover, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), launched in 2015, included funding for Morocco.

In February 2015, the Commission published a European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) strategic note exploring the feasibility of off-shore asylum processing, possibly through EU-run facilities in North Africa and key transit countries. Spain convinced the EU to provide €140 million for measures such as speedboats and staff to enforce Morocco's migration controls, and offered an additional €30 million of its own.

Stakeholders

According to Human Rights Watch, the majority of people that crossed into Ceuta at the end of July were returned to Morocco during the first days of August. The Spanish authorities state that the returns were voluntary, but the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) said that Spanish security forces carried out 'mass pushbacks' without individual assessments. On 1 August, AMDH called for a 'serious and independent inquiry' to shed light on the circumstances that led to the mass exodus and the resulting deaths, in order to establish who was responsible. They held the Moroccan government responsible for the incident and cited public anger over the country's failed domestic policies as a driving factor and condemned the 'worrying silence of officials and institutions' during the crisis.

Amnesty International urged Spanish and Moroccan authorities to prioritise human rights and dignity in their response to the massive influx at the Ceuta border. It further stressed that the unprecedented scale of the crisis does not permit collective expulsions or violations of the absolute principle of non-refoulement, demanding that authorities ensure access to the asylum system for anyone who requests it. Additionally, the organisation called for security forces to strictly adhere to international standards regarding the use of force, requested immediate healthcare and social support for the thousands left sleeping on the streets, particularly children, and strongly condemned the spread of racist rhetoric.

UNICEF Spain has called for the rights of migrant minors who have entered Spain from the Ceuta-Morocco border to be guaranteed and recalled that the repatriations of these unaccompanied children and adolescents cannot be collective. It also stressed that the repatriations of unaccompanied minor children can only be based on an individual assessment of the best interests of the child. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child – the body of 18 independent experts that monitors implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) by its state parties – has consistently and clearly stated that a child's best interests should supersede other considerations of the state, including immigration control. The CRC states that everyone under the age of 18 (the definition of a child), regardless of gender, origin, religion or possible disabilities, needs special care and protection, because children are often the most vulnerable. To this end, Save the Children expressed their concerns regarding the estimated 1 000 minors that have passed irregularly into Ceuta, and in particular regarding their dire situation. In addition, they highlighted the urgent need for mainland Spain to transfer these minors out of Ceuta's overwhelmed reception centres to ensure their safety and well-being.