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Safeguarding elections: A whole-of-society approach
Safeguarding elections: A whole-of-society approach Parliamentary Democracy Forum 2026
Naja Bentzen, Members' Research Service
Summary
European democracies and electoral processes are facing a widening spectrum of external and internal challenges, with fast-evolving technology accelerating threats. Against this backdrop, the EU is increasing its efforts to strengthen resilience against attempts to undermine electoral processes, aiming for an all-hands-on-deck approach that includes all levels of society.
Background: Concern about democracy and electoral processes
Global and European concern about democratic decline – including a deterioration in the quality of elections – is echoed by EU citizens. When asked about the most serious challenges to democracy, respondents to a 2025 Eurobarometer survey cited growing public distrust of democratic institutions and processes (49 %) and foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation (FIMI), including in elections (42 %). Respondents were most worried about voters basing decisions on disinformation (79 %), cyberattacks influencing elections (71 %), foreign countries influencing elections (70 %) and election results being manipulated (67 %).
EU action to build electoral resilience
As threat actors can draw on a rapidly advancing toolbox, safeguarding elections requires the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders across society. The organisation and conduct of elections falls within the competence of Member States, but the EU supports greater cooperation to address shared challenges, in line with the election integrity checklist. This assists Member States, based on the December 2023 Commission recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections and discussions in the European cooperation network on elections (ECNE).
The joint communication on the European democracy shield (EDS), put forward on 12 November 2025, proposes a broad set of measures to safeguard democracy, building on existing tools and regulations. Planned actions include stronger cooperation with Member States under the ECNE to enhance electoral integrity, including exchanges on election-related risk management and preparedness, as well as election observation within the EU. Under ECNE, new working groups are being established on the use of AI in electoral processes, safety in politics, political campaigning and election integrity. The Commission will support capacity-building, practical support, data collection and voluntary commitments, such as codes of conduct and ethical standards.
Other actions include updating the Digital Services Act election toolkit, cooperation with Member States on the transparency and integrity of funding in politics, and the creation of a voluntary network of EU influencers. The Commission will prepare a recommendation and guidance on best practices to ensure the safety of political candidates and elected representatives, with a special focus on women and other groups at risk of discrimination, as well as local politicians. Stakeholder consultations on safety in politics and AI in electoral processes concluded in May 2026.
In addition to the 2024 Regulation on political advertising to help safeguard the integrity of electoral processes and support open and transparent democratic debate, the Commission will work with Member States to increase the transparency and integrity of political funding, including anonymous donations and cryptocurrency (which can be used for covert political financing).
Moreover, the joint mechanism for electoral resilience, organised and coordinated through ECNE in collaboration with the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group and the rapid alert system (RAS), supports joint expert teams and exchanges, including on online forensics, disinformation and cybersecurity of elections. The code of conduct on disinformation, now part of the Digital Services Act (DSA), uses a voluntary multi-stakeholder approach to address election-related threats, not least via the rapid response system for elections. Here, civil society signatories can report time-sensitive threats to online platforms, which can take action in light of their respective policies. EU candidate countries and potential candidates, who are often the targets of electoral interference, will have greater involvement in efforts to strengthen election resilience. The EDS also proposes further cooperation with international election observers – including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe – to boost capacities to monitor disinformation on social media during election observations outside the EU.
Building on the Council's continued focus on democratic resilience and safeguarding electoral processes from foreign interference, the Irish Presidency is set to strengthen the EU's 'collective capacity to anticipate, detect and respond to threats to democracy', including by advancing 'the establishment and operationalisation of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience'.
The case of Moldova's whole-of-society response to the Kremlin's election interference
The Kremlin routinely targets elections in countries that aim to move closer to the EU, and Moldova is a case in point. Ahead of the September 2025 election, some €100 million in cryptocurrencies was reportedly invested in a multi-layered influence architecture that comprised cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and the funding of rival candidates. In response, Moldova's evolving whole-of-society approach to building democratic resilience to hybrid threats involved collaboration with the private sector, civil society and international allies, including digital cooperation between Moldova and the EU. Moreover, a disinformation and cyber threat simulation was organised to increase preparedness, in addition to efforts to promote media literacy. The EU facilitated cooperation between major online platform signatories of the code of conduct on disinformation and local civil society actors. Furthermore, a new regional hub of the European Digital Media Observatory, FACT, was established to cover Moldova and Ukraine.
Role of the European Parliament
On 18 December 2024, Parliament voted to set up a special committee on the European democracy shield (EUDS), constituted on 3 February 2025. In an own-initiative resolution adopted in committee on 23 June 2026 and in plenary on 15 September 2026, Members proposed solutions to strengthen democratic resilience in and beyond the EU. The resolution pushed for further action, including in candidate countries and potential candidate countries, to boost election management and the ability to detect and counter FIMI before and during elections. It also called for a 'know your donor'- principle for cryptocurrency-based political donations and for increased protection for female candidates.
Parliament continues to support democracy in non-EU countries and carry out external election observation activities. Parliament delegations are integrated into EU election observation missions (EOMs) or the long-term missions by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE. Parliament is consulted on the identification and planning of EU EOMs and follow-up activities.
Classification
Policy areas: EU Democracy, Institutional and Parliamentary Law
Regions: European Union
Committees: European Democracy Shield (EUDS)
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