Road to the 2026 European security strategy

Since the early 2000s, the EU has adopted strategic documents addressing an array of security challenges, including internal EU security, economic security, space, maritime security, undersea cable security and preparedness. Their evolution reflects both changes in the external security environment and shifts in the Union's understanding of its role as a security actor.

New security strategy in the making

In January 2026, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans for a new security strategy, reaffirmed later in her speech at the World Economic Forum, citing profound 'geopolitical changes' and the need for an 'appropriate response'. Following a meeting of EU foreign ministers in March 2026, HR/VP Kaja Kallas noted 'the security environment is changing fast, and we cannot respond with emergency summits alone', and called for a 'long-term policy'.

The upcoming strategy is expected to be based on a comprehensive assessment of threats, adopting a broad understanding of security. Reportedly prepared by the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) of the EEAS, the threat assessment was presented to Member States' permanent representatives in March 2026, followed by a foreign and defence minister discussion in May 2026 and further consideration in the informal meeting of defence ministers in June. It was also the subject of an informal exchange among Member States' security policy directors in late June 2026.

According to reports, the strategy will comprise three components: a threat assessment, a joint communication, and an implementation roadmap. On the basis of the threat assessment, the Commission is reportedly leading the drafting process of the remaining elements, marking a shift from the EUGS and the Strategic Compass, both of which were led by the HR/VP and the EEAS. The document is expected to be concise, potentially following the streamlined format of the 2003 ESS.

To support the drafting process, in March 2026 Member States were invited to provide input on the strategy's content through a scoping exercise aimed at identifying national priorities and areas where EU instruments could be strengthened. Although the underlying threat assessment remains classified, consultations suggest an effort to reconcile common European priorities with national security concerns. Early discussions, however, indicate divergent views among Member States: some favour a broad conception of security spanning multiple policy areas, while others advocate a more focused approach, warning that an overly expansive agenda could dilute priorities or duplicate existing frameworks.

Work on the strategy was launched following the College of Commissioners' visit to Cyprus at the start of their Council presidency in January 2026, during which the Commission President announced that 'it is time during the [Cyprus] Presidency to come with a new European security strategy'. As the strategy has not yet been released, the Irish Presidency is expected to continue advancing the file. This initiative is not included in the Commission's 2026 work programme, which was published before the announcement of the new strategy.

What the strategy is expected to address

From the outset, the strategy is expected to redefine the EU's role as a security actor, moving beyond the notion of a 'better' (2003 ESS) or merely 'volatile' (2016 EUGS) world towards one characterised by sustained uncertainty. In March 2026, Member State ambassadors emphasised that it should reinforce European strategic autonomy and the rules-based international order,while calling for a comprehensive approach to security, including cybersecurity, hybrid threats, migration and organised crime. Echoing the Compass progress report's view that 'more than ever, Europeans share a common threat assessment', the strategy is expected to forge a shared EU‑27 narrative on key security priorities. After the March 2026 Foreign Affairs Council, the HR/VP declared it would take a 'broad view of security, linking defence, energy, supply chains, and other policy areas'.

The strategy is likely to address both conventional and non-conventional threats. On defence readiness, deterrence and capability development, it will reflect the broader defence-readiness agenda post-2022 as well as the recently announced US review of its military posture and bases in Europe. It is also expected to build on the latest Compass progress report, including measures to close critical capability gaps across the nine priority capability areas, mobilise additional defence funding and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with Ukraine in defence, technology, innovation, resilience and industry. Defence innovation is likely to feature, drawing on the EU's defence industry transformation roadmap, while discussions on operationalising Article 42(7) TEU (Treaty on European Union) may also inform the final document. Several Member States on the eastern flank have reportedly pushed for greater emphasis on resilience and territorial defence, informed by recent experiences of drone incursions, electronic warfare, GPS jamming and the instrumentalisation of migration.

Alongside traditional military threats, the strategy is expected to emphasise hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, foreign information manipulation and interference, economic coercion, and vulnerabilities linked to emerging technologies. Energy and economic security, supply chain resilience, critical infrastructure protection, and nuclear security are also expected to feature prominently. In doing so, the document will build on the '360-degree approach' to security advanced in the defence readiness roadmap 2030, recognising that threats originate from multiple domains and require a coordinated response that integrates military, economic, technological, energy and societal security dimensions.

On threat actors, the strategy is expected to recalibrate the EU's approach to actors demonstrating sustained malicious activity toward the EU, particularly Russia. This would align with the European Parliament's call for 'an EU-wide Russia strategy that links deterrence, containment [and] accountability'.

The strategy is also likely to take stock of the EU's relationship with the United States in light of recent geopolitical developments, including efforts to assert control over Greenland, trade disputes and calls for Europe to assume more responsibility for conventional defence. The forthcoming strategy may also, once again, serve as a response to the US's 2025 National Security Strategy, which Parliament viewed as transactional and marking a shift from long-standing US foreign policy.

As in earlier strategic documents, the EU's neighbourhood is expected to remain central. Whereas the 2003 ESS advocated a 'ring of well-governed countries', the new strategy may reflect a more competitive geopolitical environment in which eastern and southern neighbours face growing external pressure. It may provide a strategic basis for initiatives such as the Global Gateway, aimed at mitigating dependency risks and diversifying external alignments. Ukraine is likely to hold a pivotal place in this framework, especially given its growing integration into the defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), with Moldova and the Western Balkans also likely accorded prominent attention. Building on tools developed under the Compass, including resilience support for Moldova, the strategy might call for stronger long-term engagement and tailored short-term assistance.

The strategy is expected to reaffirm the EU's commitment to 'effective multilateralism', while adapting it to present international environment. EU-NATO cooperation is likely to form a central pillar, building on the alignment of strategic documents in 2022, contributions to the 2025 preparedness union strategy, and the strengthening of political dialogue, including the resumption of meetings between the Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council. Priorities for NATO's 2026 Ankara Summit, including capability development, burden-sharing and support for Ukraine, may similarily shape EU planning. The strategy is expected to support deeper cooperation with selected partners, including through security and defence partnerships.

Finally, the forthcoming strategy may further consolidate the EU's growing engagement in conflict prevention, crisis management and peace mediation. Recent initiatives with the United Nations and the African Union suggest an effort to strengthen the EU's role as a security provider through enhanced political dialogue, operational cooperation and targeted financial support. This includes the adoption of new EU-UN Joint Priorities on Peace and Security in September 2025, continued support for African-led Peace Support Operations through the European Peace Facility, and reinforced cooperation with the African Union on preventive diplomacy and peace mediation.

What experts expect from the strategy

From a political and strategic perspective, the Egmont Institute sees the strategy taking shape amid growing European convergence in response to geopolitical shocks, including tensions surrounding Greenland, and increased support for European strategic autonomy; trends also reflected in recent European Council on Foreign Relations polling. At the same time, the strategy must remain adaptable to unforeseen developments, noting that 'if Europe waits for the perfect conditions, the moment to act will have passed'. Carnegie Europe similarly argues that previous EU strategies have relied on an overly cautious reading of the geopolitical environment, often avoiding explicit identification of adversaries. Along with other analysts, they warn that vague language risks undermining the strategy's operational objectives. The Atlantic Council likewise stresses the need to update the EU's strategic framework, while cautioning against treating the strategy as a cure-all for Europe's security challenges.

Several experts emphasise the importance of implementation and political ownership. Sven Biscop links the Commission's leading role in drafting the strategy to its expanding role in implementing EU security objectives beyond the EEAS's traditional foreign policy remit. He argues that the EU should move beyond a reactive posture and adopt a strategy that both defines Europe's place in the world and commits the Union to acting upon it. Others see merit in linking the new strategy to the next multiannual financial framework. The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) warns against a declaratory exercise, calling for strong political buy-in, a clear implementation roadmap, coverage of security domains beyond defence and deeper cooperation with partners.

On defence innovation, Carnegie Europe expects the strategy to clarify how the EU intends to convert civilian technological advances into deployable military capabilities without unnecessarily securitising civilian life. It also calls for a stronger strategic rationale underpinning flagship projects under the defence readiness roadmap 2030, arguing that 'a shield is a posture, not a strategy' in reference to the European air shield and space shield initiatives, noting that such initiatives should be integrated into a broader strategic framework rather than treated as standalone strategies.

On external relations, the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) expects the strategy to identify Russia as the most immediate threat to the EU's territorial integrity, while prioritising support for the EDTIB, and assistance to Ukraine and its path towards EU membership. The OSW also anticipates a focus on partnerships with Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, Japan and South Korea.

On EU–NATO relations, ECDPM argues that the strategy should 'affirm the EU as a peace actor' and 'embrace a multidimensional understanding of security', while clarifying the complementary roles of the EU, its Member States and NATO across defence, deterrence, resilience, human security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The OSW further suggests that a reduced US role in Europe could 'revive earlier proposals to develop EU command structures'.

European Parliament position

During the structured dialogue on the Commission work programme held in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 17 March 2026, AFET Chair David McAllister asked HR/VP Kaja Kallas to involve the European Parliament prior to the finalisation of the strategy, while the HR/VP confirmed that the Parliament would be consulted.

Although drafted before the new strategy was announced, Parliament's January 2026 resolution on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) already called for a revision of the Strategic Compass to strengthen the EU's civil and military preparedness. The 2026 resolution on the implementation of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) stated 'the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU's own strategic objectives and continues to define, assert and defend its interests worldwide'.

In April 2016, ahead of the EUGS's adoption, Parliament adopted a resolution calling for greater coherence in EU foreign and security policy. It argued that 'European intelligence exchanges should be improved and a true European intelligence and forecasting capacity developed' and stressed the need for 'positive synergies ... between increasingly interlinked external action policies and internal policies at EU level, within Member States, and between the EEAS and the Commission'. It further recommended that the EUGS 'be revised every five years, in synchrony with the new European Parliament and the new Commission'. In 2004, Parliament also expressed its position on the European security strategy.