Introduction

The European Peace Facility (EPF), operational since July 2021, finances activities with military implications, including the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad, and supports the armies of partner countries with infrastructure, training and equipment. In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU quickly mobilised funds for the delivery by Member States of military equipment, including lethal weaponry – a first in EU history – to assist Ukraine. However, in a context of rising global insecurity, with other wars and violent conflicts erupting worldwide, as well as transactional or confrontational relations between countries challenging the international order, the EU needs a robust EPF to support partners and regions beyond Ukraine and the Black Sea.

The EPF operates outside the EU budget and is funded through contributions from the 27 EU Member States based on their gross national income. However, necessary increases in the EPF budget and EPF mobilisations are not immune to blockages from Member States.

In search of fresh resources for the EPF, particularly to continue providing Ukraine with much needed military assistance in the face of Russian aggression, the EU must be innovative, especially as United States (US) support has become uncertain. Besides Ukraine, the EU also provides military assistance to other partners in the wider Black Sea region, such as Georgia, Moldova and Armenia, and to other fragile regions within its expanded vicinity. These regions include Africa (Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, the Gulf of Guinea, the Central African Republic, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and Mozambique, whose army benefitted from the first two mobilisations of the EPF in July and November 2021), despite the forced closure of the EU military missions in the Sahel (Niger and Mali). Closer by regions, such as the Balkans (Kosovo, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro), as well as the Middle East (Jordan and Lebanon), also receive such support.

Funding for Ukraine

In March 2024, the EU decided to allocate €5 billion in military aid to Ukraine through a third top-up to the initial EPF budget, taking the shape of a dedicated fund, the Ukraine Assistance Fund. Faced with Hungary's refusal to support the move, mobilising these resources proved challenging. The EU then decided to channel through the EPF the extraordinary revenues of the Russian assets located within its banks, which it had frozen as part of its sanctions against Russia, to ensure the military aid Kyiv needed. However, the EPF was soon replaced as the channel for these revenues to Ukraine by an EU macro-financial assistance loan (MFA loan) for Ukraine worth €18.1 billion, together with an accompanying Ukraine Loan Assistance Mechanism. This loan is the EU's part of a G7-led initiative for an extraordinary revenue acceleration (ERA) loan for Ukraine worth US$50 billion (€45 billion), to be repaid by future flows of extraordinary revenues from frozen Russian sovereign assets held in the EU.

On 10 January 2025, the European Commission disbursed the first €3 billion tranche of the EU's MFA loan for Ukraine.

Windfall profits from frozen Russian assets: Double allocation mode

The situation regarding the payments of the windfall profits obtained through the freezing of the Russian assets for Ukraine is as follows. For 2024, the only payment, on 26 July 2024, was channelled to Ukraine through the EPF for 90 % of the funds and through the Ukraine Facility for 10 % of the funds (as mentioned above). For 2025, the first biannual payment will continue to be channelled through the EPF for 90 % of the funds and through the Ukraine Facility for 10 % of the funds. All payments thereafter will be channelled through the EPF for 5 % of the funds (for military support) and through the newly established Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism for 95 % of the funds (to guarantee the loans agreed under the mechanism). There are no conditionalities or restrictions as to the civilian or military destination of the expenses Ukraine will pay with these loans.

Josep Borrell suggested that the US$300 billion of Russian state assets frozen in the West could potentially be used to assist Ukraine in rebuilding after the war as part of a 'just and sustainable peace'. This would represent a significant shift from the current practice of solely using the windfall profits from the frozen Russian assets for support to Ukraine's military and for the country's reconstruction, to actually using the capital itself.

HR/VP Kaja Kallas, during her confirmation hearing before the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs on 12 November 2024, also acknowledged the 'legitimacy' of Ukraine's request to use the frozen Russian assets for reconstruction. She reportedly stated that, given the scale of destruction of Ukraine, there would be nothing left from those assets: 'We must use these funds, it is Russia that is destroying Ukraine and will have to pay for its reconstruction'.

The potential seizure of the frozen Russian assets, specifically the capital, has raised concerns about legal uncertainties, the risk of major investors shunning the EU, and opposition from the European Central Bank and Euroclear Belgium.

At least €6 billion worth of EPF funds for Ukraine remain blocked

In his above-mentioned press remarks after the 24 June 2024 Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Josep Borrell expressed regret that 'one country' was still 'blocking the use of about €6 billion from the EPF'. He did not specify the exact composition of this amount, yet an analysis suggests the following:

Speaking to reporters after the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 14 April 2025, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, stated that he had unsuccessfully reiterated his request to Hungary to lift its veto on 'nearly €7 billion' from the EPF.

Interestingly, Hungary did not veto two important Council decisions in April and May 2023. These decisions, (CFSP) 2023/810 of 13 April 2023 and (CFSP) 2023/927 of 5 May 2023), activated a fresh €2 billion from the EPF for artillery ammunition. This ammunition could either be donated to Ukraine and partially reimbursed to the donating Member States, or delivered at a later stage through joint procurement by Member States. These Council decisions were the first two tracks of the three-track ammunition plan for Ukraine. Hungary constructively abstained from voting on these two decisions.

However, considering the persistent urgent need for military support and ammunition for Ukraine, on 17 March 2025 the HR/VP presented a €20 billion initiative for continued military aid at the Council. This plan includes €5 billion for the quick delivery of 2 billion ammunition rounds. Prior to this, at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council meeting of 6 March 2025, for the first time since 2022 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hungary opposed the adoption of official European Council 'conclusions at 27' on continued support for Ukraine. This led to the remaining 26 Member States having to deliver separate conclusions on the matter.

At the above European Council meeting, the HR/VP declared that for her new initiative on the continuation of military support, she would apply the formula of the 'coalition of the willing', 'so that one country cannot block everybody else', referencing the Hungarian veto in the Council. Her initiative was expected to be endorsed by 26 Member States, minus Hungary, at the European Council of 20 March. However, reportedly, this was not the case, as some other countries, including France, Italy and Spain, which had expected to be the major financial contributors to the HR/VP initiative, welcomed it with reservations. The 'conclusions at 26' of the 20 March European Council meeting only state: 'The European Council recalls the initiatives to enhance EU military support to Ukraine, notably that of the High Representative to coordinate increased support by Member States and other participating States, on a voluntary basis, notably on large-calibre artillery ammunition and missiles, as well as the military needs component of the G7 ERA initiative'. This wording was far from being an endorsement of the HR/VP initiative. However, when it comes to the artillery ammunition, a coalition of the willing, led by Germany and the Netherlands, obtained at least partial results. In her press remarks after the Foreign Affair Council meeting of 14 April, the HR/VP announced that two-thirds of the target of delivering 2 million shells had already been reached, equating to about 1.3 million shells.

New EPF-funded common costs of military missions and operations abroad

Common costs increased for EUMAM Ukraine

On 8 November 2024, the Council decided to extend the initial two-year mandate of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) for an additional two years, from 14 November 2024 to 15 November 2026. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2876 also increased the EPF-funded common costs of the mission for that period. These costs now amount to €408.8 million within the EPF's operations pillar, which is a significant increase compared to the €106.7 million for the previous period (November 2022-November 2024). EUMAM Ukraine also received direct additional funding from the EPF's assistance pillar, with assistance measures totalling €255 million so far.

According to the HR/VP, EUMAM had already trained over 73 000 soldiers by mid-April 2025.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of the Member States' ambassadors, had agreed on 22 October 2024 that a strategic assessment of the mission should be presented no later than January 2025,with a view to assist in the taking of a decision to enhance the capabilities and effectiveness of EUMAM Ukraine. The assessment will be followed by a strategic review, which is to be conducted before 15 November 2026. At its meeting on 14 April 2025,the Foreign Affairs Council debated the issue of expanding 'the mandate of the missions that we have' (as worded by the HR/VP, a reference to EUMAM Ukraine, the EU civilian Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine, and perhaps also to the EU civilian Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine) in order to contribute to the security guarantees of a coalition of the willing (led by France and the United Kingdom).

Data source: Graphic by: Stephanie Pradier, Samy Chahri, EPRS.

EPF-funded assistance measures adopted since April 2024

Since the two assistance measures (AM) of €194 million in total for Ukraine, adopted on 27 and 28 November 2023, the Council has adopted, or the PSC has approved in the case of the support to Somalia and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) under the general AM of €600 million for African-led Peace Support Operations for 2022-2024, the following 22 AMs, funded from the assistance pillar of the EPF, for the armies of partner countries, or for ATMIS:

Out of these 22 new EPF-funded AMs, decided between April 2024 and April 2025, five are the first ever to support the armed forces of Egypt, Armenia, Albania, Kenya and Montenegro. The other 17 AMs complement previous AMs. For instance, the AM for Jordan from 25 November 2024 adds to a previous AM of €7 million decided on 20 February 2023, while the AM for Lebanon from 21 January complements two previous AMs (the first of 23 September 2024 for €15 million and the second of 1 December 2022 for €6 million). Notably, none of these 22 recent AMs benefits Ukraine, as they are all directed to other fragile regions in the broader EU vicinity. These are the EU neighbourhood and its two flanks. These are the eastern flank with Moldova, Armenia, North Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, and the southern flank with Lebanon and Egypt, the Horn of Africa with Somalia and Kenya, the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea region (with Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Benin and the Republic of the Congo), and Mozambique.

According to the Council, the AMs for North Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro aim to strengthen the countries' capacities to participate in the EU's common security and defence policy operations and missions and other international missions. These AMs reflect the consistent commitment of the three countries to enhancing their cooperation in security and defence. For Albania and Montenegro, there is a goal of 'full alignment with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy'(CFSP), while for North Macedonia, the Council press release uses the expression 'with a view to a full alignment' with the CFSP.

The 18 November 2024 AM for the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in the Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique continues to support the deployment of the RDF in that province, following a first AM of a similar amount (€20 million), decided on 1 December 2022. Both AMs have raised criticism among think tanks (such as Egmont) and NGOs (such as Global Witness), due to the UN-documented support from the RDF to the M23 rebellion in eastern DRC and the RDF's presence in eastern DRC. The fact that seven months after the first AM (December 2022) of €20 million for the RDF in Mozambique, the Council adopted another AM of the same amount for the DRC's Armed Forces (FARDC) on 20 July 2023 is unlikely to make Congolese authorities and people oblivious to the EU's continued support to the army of an invader. Paradoxically, the AM for the DRC, implemented by the Belgian Ministry of Defence, is in the form of support to equip the Belgium-trained 31st Rapid Reaction Brigade of the FARDC, active in eastern DRC, and to rehabilitate the brigade's headquarters.

Belgium constructively abstained from voting in the Council on the recent second AM for the RDF in the Cabo Delgado Province, emphasising that RDF's presence in DRC territory violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, as well as the UN Charter. Belgium also stressed the importance of strictly adhering to the additional conditionalities outlined in the first AM of December 2022, 'in order to ensure that the aid remains exclusively dedicated to the fight against terrorism in Mozambique by the RDF, in support of the Mozambican armed forces and for the benefit of the Mozambican people, and is not diverted to other purposes or used for other operational areas'. However, the implementation of these conditionalities seems unlikely, as noted in the Egmont policy brief. The conditionality of theatre disconnection cannot be controlled or enforced on the ground, and once EPF funds are transferred to the Rwandan Ministry of Finance, they cannot be traced. Additionally, the UN Group of Experts on DRC reported that three FDR commanders have been operating in both Rwandan intervention forces in Mozambique and in the DRC.

The second AM for the Rwandan army in Mozambique sparked renewed controversy when on 27 January 2025, Rwanda-backed Congolese Tutsi rebels of the M23, along with Rwandan soldiers, entered and captured Goma, the capital city of North-Kivu Province in the DRC. On 16 February, they also took control of Bukavu, the capital city of South-Kivu Province, and on 19 March, they seized Walikale (North-Kivu), a potential key transit point on the way to the DRC capital Kinshasa. After a momentary withdrawal from the centre of Walikale, on 22 April the M23 reportedly tried to strengthen their positions around Walikale.

In a resolution of 13 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern DRC, the European Parliament called on the Commission and the Member States to review EPF assistance to the Rwandan Defence Force in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province. At a press conference after the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 25 February, the HR/VP announced that EU defence consultations with Rwanda had been suspended. On 17 March, the Council sanctioned another nine Rwandans and Congolese individuals and one entity in relation to the conflict in the east and the advance of the M23.