Benefits of joint procurement

Firstly, aggregating demand across Member States generates economies of scale. Larger, consolidated orders reduce average unit costs by distributing fixed production expenditure, R&D outlays and associated overheads across greater output volumes. Put simply: 'When each country orders only 50 or 100 units of a system, rather than pooling demand for several hundred, the unit cost of tanks, ships or aircraft is far higher than it would be in a larger market.' Joint procurement also enhances bargaining power. Scale enhances not only efficiency but also bargaining leverage. By aggregating demand, the EU can strengthen its negotiating power vis‑a‑vis suppliers and vendors. This concentration of purchasing power enables it to shape market conditions and secure more advantageous procurement terms, including reduced prices and improved contractual arrangements. It also mitigates competitive bidding among Member States for scarce resources, which can otherwise drive up prices and distort markets. According to a 2024 EPRS study, meeting the long-standing 35 % collaborative procurement target could generate annual savings of up to €3.2 billion, with further gains possible through deeper cooperation. Increased joint procurement would strengthen the European defence industry, stimulate research and capability development, and promote convergence in military standards. Additional benefits include job creation, more efficient public spending and improved interoperability, potentially extending equipment lifespans. More coordinated defence equipment procurement from third countries could yield savings of up to €3.0 billion. Considering a high ambition scenario, up to €10.9 billion per year in savings may be possible. Earlier estimates by the Commission suggest that joint procurement could generate savings of up to 30 % in annual defence expenditure – resources that could then be reinvested in more efficient, modern and strategically advanced defence production.

Secondly, there are equally significant industrial benefits. Aggregate orders placed through a central coordinating body provide long-term predictability to manufacturers, enabling them to expand production lines, secure supply chains and recruit skilled labour. This is particularly relevant in the current context of constrained European stocks and limited surge capacity. The main defence industry lobby group, ASD Europe, strongly supports the renewed emphasis on collaborative procurement. According to ASD, aggregating demand and harmonising requirements would generate economies of scale, shorten lead times, reduce costs and improve efficiency, provided that new contracts are awarded to European suppliers to reduce dependencies and safeguard security of supply. From an industrial perspective, long-term and predictable orders are essential to providing planning certainty. With such scale and predictability, the European defence industry could scale up production, accelerate delivery and meet European capability needs with advanced systems.

Thirdly, common procurement fosters interoperability. The proliferation of different weapons systems and platforms across Member States complicates logistics, maintenance, training and joint operations. Joint acquisition reduces the variety of equipment types in service, thereby facilitating standardisation and compatibility among armed forces. EU Member States field larger aggregate numbers of main battle tanks, artillery systems and infantry fighting vehicles than the United States (US), yet these assets remain dispersed across numerous models, limiting standardisation and interoperability. By contrast, the US relies on a narrower range of platforms, which streamlines logistics, training and operational coordination. Similar fragmentation characterises the naval domain, where Member States operate diverse classes of frigates, destroyers and submarines. At the same time, limited fleets of air-to-air refuelling aircraft and medium and heavy transport aircraft reveal enduring gaps in strategic air mobility compared with the US. This fragmentation stems from legacy Soviet-era equipment, misaligned national planning cycles and industrial constraints. According to the EDA, more systematic collaborative planning and procurement, supported by clear EU‑level priorities and financial incentives, could mitigate these inefficiencies over time.

Fourthly, joint procurement embeds solidarity in practical and measurable terms. Rather than simply remaining a stated principle, solidarity becomes formalised through shared financial commitments, collective burden-sharing and mutual dependence on capability development. This also includes coordination of planning cycles and delivery timetables. In the current security environment, joint acquisition sends a clear strategic signal regarding the Union's capacity to act cohesively in the defence domain. It demonstrates an ability to aggregate demand, reduce fragmentation and generate economies of scale, thereby addressing long-standing inefficiencies identified in successive EU and national assessments. Beyond its immediate material effects, coordinated procurement also contributes to strategic autonomy by reducing critical dependencies and enhancing interoperability and structural interdependence among armed forces. It thus supports the gradual consolidation of a more integrated European defence posture grounded not only in shared values but also capabilities.

Finally, joint procurement can improve administrative efficiency over time. Although initial coordination is complex, shared procedures and joint tenders reduce the duplication of parallel national procurement processes. For instance, the experience accumulated within the EDA provides institutional expertise that smaller Member States can leverage, thereby enhancing the professionalism and efficiency of defence acquisition systems. Scholarly analysis of joint public procurement across the EU further shows that pooled demand and joint tendering can avoid multiple parallel acquisition exercises, thereby reducing administrative burdens on participating States. A practical example of this dynamic in action is the joint ordering of 155 mm ammunition by multiple Member States under the EDA framework, illustrating how coordinated procurement can streamline processes that would otherwise be conducted separately and possibly at greater length.

An analyst notes that the strategic implications are pressing for Member States. The capacity to equip armed forces rapidly and at sustainable cost is increasingly constrained by structural limitations in Europe's defence industrial base. The challenge extends beyond slow output. It stems from a fragmented procurement architecture that prevents the Union from exploiting economies of scale. Nationally segmented orders, placed with limited cross-border coordination, inhibit the efficient scaling of production. This fragmentation inflates unit costs and prolongs delivery times. Breaking this pattern requires coordinated, large‑volume procurement across Member States. Only aggregated demand can provide industry with the predictability and scale necessary to reduce costs and accelerate production cycles. In the context of rising demand for advanced military capabilities, such coordination is no longer optional but operationally necessary. Delivering it, however, presupposes a fundamental recalibration of national approaches to defence policy and procurement.

Possible drawbacks of joint procurement

Firstly, common procurement may reduce flexibility at national level. Member States retain primary responsibility for defence under Article 42 Treaty on European Union and may be reluctant to subordinate urgent operational needs to collective timelines, especially due to their differences in strategic culture – a common understanding of threats and challenges as a basis for collective action. In practice, Member States differ in their threat perceptions and levels of ambition. Some retain a predominantly Atlanticist outlook centred on NATO, while others promote greater European strategic autonomy. These divergences translate into fragmented approaches to capability planning, procurement and threat assessment. Where threat perceptions diverge or capability priorities differ, joint acquisition can prove politically difficult. Larger Member States with established defence industries may also perceive reduced strategic autonomy if procurement decisions are shaped by collective rather than national industrial considerations. This is made worse by the fact that, in the field of defence planning, the Union has developed multiple, partially overlapping supporting instruments rather than a single integrated framework. European defence planning thus continues to be characterised by fragmentation and limited integration. As observers have argued, defence planning processes remain predominantly anchored at national level rather than being structured coherently at European or even transatlantic scale, reflecting persistent deficits in political commitment. Experts therefore contend that joint procurement will remain unsustainable without genuine common defence planning, adequate funding and clearer governance. They stress the need for institutional clarity, with a stronger coordinating role for the EDA to avoid fragmentation and power struggles.

Secondly, industrial cooperation can generate tensions. Decisions regarding workshare, production location and intellectual property rights often become politically sensitive. Without carefully designed governance mechanisms, joint procurement risks reinforcing existing industrial asymmetries or triggering disputes over fair return. Previous multinational armaments programmes in Europe have demonstrated that workshare negotiations can cause inefficiencies and cost overruns if not tightly managed. Disputes over leadership, workshare and intellectual property in multinational capability programmes reflect deeper structural divisions, as national industrial priorities frequently override pan‑European logic and constrain trust-based cooperation. The public clash between Airbus and Dassault over the future combat air system (FCAS) in 2025, alongside Germany considering alternative partnerships with Saab or BAE Systems, illustrates how governance deadlock and political uncertainty risk delaying flagship projects and fragmenting European defence integration. These issues have led to a situation where 'an announcement that [the project] is over is more likely than a relaunch'.

Thirdly, if joint procurement isn't managed efficiently, there is a risk of duplication. The coexistence of national procurement authorities, EU-level instruments and NATO frameworks may generate overlapping procedures. Unless coordination mechanisms are streamlined, transaction costs could offset part of the expected efficiency gains. There is already a long list of different forms of collaboration on armament procurement in the EU. A recent analysis by the European Union Institute for Security Studies identified around 200 defence partnerships linking EU Member States with one another and with strategic partners such as the US and Norway. A substantial proportion of these arrangements concern armament cooperation, notably in the areas of acquisition and procurement. In addition, a number of European bodies have been established with specific mandates to facilitate and support collaborative efforts in the field of armaments among Member States and partner countries (see below). Indeed, Camille Grand, the secretary general of ASD Europe, cautioned that Europe's expanding defence efforts risk duplication and inefficiency unless political leaders clarify institutional responsibilities. With national governments, NATO, the European Commission and the EDA all launching initiatives, governance remains fragmented. He called for clearer decision-making structures, particularly in areas such as air and missile defence, to ensure faster and more coherent capability delivery.

Fourthly, coordination among multiple sovereign actors may increase administrative complexity. In multinational capability programmes, governments must reconcile divergent threat perceptions, planning cycles and procurement rules. This process often generates protracted negotiations before a common target can be translated into harmonised technical specifications and a joint contract. One expert notes that differences in national regulatory and budgetary procedures can delay signature and implementation of defence contracts, particularly where unanimity or consensus is required. In practice, the requirement to synchronise parliamentary approval procedures, align multiannual financial frameworks and agree on workshare arrangements has frequently extended the preparatory phase of multinational armaments cooperation beyond initial planning assumptions.

Fifth, the reduction of costs in joint procurement is not guaranteed. One analyst questions the assumption that jointly building and procuring weapons will automatically reduce costs through economies of scale. While acknowledging that Europe's fragmented defence market generates inefficiencies, he argues that consolidation does not in itself guarantee savings or innovation. Cost reductions depend on credible, sustained and aggregated demand. Without this, fewer suppliers may weaken competitive pressure and undermine cost control. He also highlights governance risks, noting that political bargaining over workshare and industrial returns can dilute efficiency gains. He argues that joint procurement can deliver benefits, but only if accompanied by realistic demand signals, sound programme governance and preserved competition. Pooling is not a substitute for effective market and institutional design. Indeed, the joint procurement by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Türkiye and the United Kingdom of the Airbus A400m military transport aircraft faced heavy delays and cost overruns. Therefore, according to experts: 'There are only a handful of truly European capability projects that have made it to life, albeit with the familiar problems of cost and delivery overruns (e.g. Eurofighter, A400M). So, Europeans are spending more on defence, but whether they can spend better or spend together in the future remains to be seen.'

Finally, the concentration of purchasing power at Union level may create monopsony effects (existence of only one buyer). While stronger bargaining power can reduce prices in the short term, sustained compression of profit margins risks weakening incentives for research and development. Producers facing reduced returns in the EU market may scale back activity or reallocate investment to jurisdictions with more favourable conditions. Indeed, defence procurement relies on cost‑plus, fixed price and target cost contracts, each allocating risk and incentives differently between governments and industry, yet all remain vulnerable to information asymmetries and strategic behaviour. Market fragmentation in Europe reflects the structural nature of defence as a public good, with the state acting simultaneously as regulator, owner and principal customer, creating monopsonistic demand and oligopolistic supply conditions. In this 'sole buyer and sole seller' dynamic, both sides are mutually dependent, as governments face limited suppliers while firms rely heavily on public contracts.

EU Member States' collaboration

Beyond EU‑level initiatives, Member States frequently cooperate directly to develop or procure defence equipment. These bilateral or 'mini-lateral' frameworks, sometimes involving NATO allies or third countries, are shaped by national priorities and intergovernmental agreements rather than supranational governance. Driven by shared capability needs, geographic proximity, political alignment and industrial complementarities, they emerge pragmatically outside formal EU structures and constitute a bottom-up form of defence integration that balances sovereignty with efficiency, interoperability and cost-sharing objectives.

In some cases, cooperation goes beyond the acquisition phase and includes long-term maintenance, training, logistical support or even joint operation of the equipment. A prominent example is the strategic airlift capability (SAC), through which 12 NATO members (including 10 EU Member States, Norway and the US) jointly operate three Boeing C‑17 Globemaster III strategic transport aircraft (used, inter alia, to support earthquake relief operations in Haiti in 2010 and as logistics support to the 2014 MH17 crash investigation in Ukraine). Another example is the recent technical agreement on joint procurement of CV90 Mk IV infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) planned for early 2026 by Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Sweden (CV90 IFVs were already delivered to Ukraine in 2023). According to their statement of intent, the cooperation aims at a standardised CV90 variant for all participants, including common training systems, ammunition and spare parts, thereby enhancing interoperability and lifecycle efficiency. Furthermore, in 2022, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom opted for collaborative procurement of all-terrain vehicles, some of which were delivered in 2025. Bilateral cooperation also remains particularly common. Notable examples include an agreement between Germany and Norway to jointly develop and procure six U212 common design submarines pertaining to joint development, procurement and training (the German Bundeswehr Procurement Office has since increased the order from two to six, with delivery planned annually from 2032 to 2037), and the coordinated selection of IFVs by the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2022. A similar approach can be observed in the 2024 Danish-Swedish cooperation on IFV procurement, some of which were a replacement for vehicles previously donated to Ukraine. These cases demonstrate how Member States continue to pursue aligned procurement timelines, harmonised requirements and industrial coordination.

Role of NATO and OCCAR

At the Vilnius summit in 2023, allied leaders approved the defence production action plan, aimed at accelerating joint procurement and expanding industrial production capabilities across the alliance. The plan seeks to facilitate aggregation of demand, notably through multi-year multinational procurement contracts for prioritised capabilities. This commitment was further reinforced by NATO defence ministers in February 2025, who agreed on a revised version of the plan to sustain the momentum in defence industrial ramp-up. Political decisions build upon the framework of the NATO planning process (NDPP), which provides the strategic basis for aligning capability targets between allies. Operational implementation of these objectives is largely channelled through NATO's Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). Established in 1958 (in its current structure since 2015), the agency supports allied and partner countries in logistics and procurement, with particular expertise in off-the-shelf acquisition of ammunition and equipment. Operating on a 'no profit-no loss' principle and fully funded by its customers, NSPA serves as a central platform for multinational acquisitions and lifecycle management. Since the onset of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, interest in NSPA's services has increased, particularly from 2023 onwards, possibly reflecting countries' higher defence expenditure and urgent replenishment needs. NSPA currently manages 32 multinational support partnerships covering over 90 weapons systems and 170 projects, including the MFF/MRTT fleet on behalf of participating states. In January 2024, NSPA announced support to Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain for the joint purchase of Patriot surface-to-air missiles, alongside the delivery of critical munitions, including around 220 000 155 mm artillery shells. In February 2026, NSPA awarded Rheinmetall a contract valued at approximately €200 million for the supply of 120 mm tank ammunition. Cooperation between the EU and NATO in delivering critical defence capabilities is particularly noteworthy in the field of air-to-air refuelling, long identified as a major European capability shortfall. In 2012, the EDA initiated a project at the request of participating Member States to harmonise requirements for air-to-air refuelling and address fragmentation in European procurement efforts. As the project progressed into the acquisition phase, responsibility was transferred in 2016 to the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), which acted as the contract executing authority. OCCAR placed the procurement order on behalf of NSPA, resulting in the acquisition of Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft. The first aircraft was delivered in 2020. This process ultimately led to the establishment of the multinational MRTT fleet (MMF), comprising EU Member States and Norway. While initiated through the EDA framework, the fleet is owned by NATO, managed by NSPA and operated from bases located in both NATO and EU Member States. Furthermore, in April 2024, NSPA approved the first counter-small unmanned aircraft systems (C-sUAS) procurement framework agreement in the history of NATO, marking a significant step in the alliance's collective approach to addressing emerging aerial threats.

Furthermore, established in 1996, the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) aims to streamline joint capability development and facilitate collaborative armament programmes. Its membership is currently limited to six European countries on the basis of a signed convention (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the UK) but allows for participation of other EU and NATO members as well as like-minded countries (e.g., Australia for the NATO-standard light weight torpedo and Brazil, as an observer, in the logistics support ship programme). In total, OCCAR currently manages over 20 programmes. Institutional ties between the EU and OCCAR have deepened significantly in recent years. In November 2024, the European Commission signed a financial framework partnership agreement (FFPA) with OCCAR, enabling indirect management of EU-funded defence projects. Under this arrangement, OCCAR became the first non‑EU entity entrusted by DG DEFIS to manage EU defence activities within such a framework, while the Commission secured observer status in OCCAR‑led programmes. Prior cooperation had already taken place under the European defence industrial development programme (EDIDP). This included projects such as the European secure software defined radio (ESSOR) on behalf of six EU Member States and the medium altitude long endurance remotely piloted aircraft system (MALE RPAS), and the European Defence Fund on European Patrol Corvette, the EU HYDEF interceptor programme, E‑NACSOS and the hyper sonic interceptor study (HYDIS2). The EDA signed a security arrangement with OCCAR in 2014, complementing the security agreement of 2012 between OCCAR and the EU.

OCCAR's cooperation with NATO structures is equally well established. A framework memorandum of understanding between OCCAR and NSPA has been in place since 2005, followed by a security agreement signed in 2009. A dedicated cooperation agreement between OCCAR and NSPA since 2014 has enabled arrangements like the multinational MRTT fleet acquisition, under which OCCAR managed the procurement of aircraft on behalf of NATO. More broadly, the NSPA‑OCCAR framework has supported collaboration in relevant programmes, including the counter-battery radar systems (COBRA) and the A400M strategic transport aircraft. Within these arrangements, OCCAR retains responsibility for programme management and the in-service support (ISS) phase of collaborative programmes, while NSPA performs material support functions, such as depot-level maintenance and spare parts management.

Overall, while these agreements reflect the growing tendency of EU/NATO states to pool demand and operate in complementary and mutually reinforcing ways in European joint capability development and procurement, they are not a panacea and could mean significant trade‑offs. The possible drawbacks identified in joint procurement may apply to such arrangements regardless of which institution, agency or group of Member States channels the initiative.