Background

The proposed Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) is part of the first package of proposals put forward by the Commission for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the period 2028-2034. It was released on 16 July 2025.¹ In line with the new MFF's overall aim to reduce fragmentation and complexity of the EU's funding instruments, the scope of the proposed future UCPM is broader than that of the current mechanism, established by Decision No 1313/2013/EU. It integrates support for health emergency preparedness and response, which are currently covered under the EU4Health programme.² Consistent with the 'new ambition on crisis and security preparedness' in Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's Political Guidelines, the proposed instrument places great emphasis on anticipation and preparedness. Drawing on Sauli Niinistö's report on EU civil and military preparedness (2024), the initiative contributes to the implementation of the European Preparedness Union strategy put forward by the Commission in March 2025. The latter introduces the concept of 'preparedness by design' as a horizontal principle to ensure that preparedness and security considerations are integrated and mainstreamed across EU legislation, policies and programmes.

The UCPM was set up in 2001 to strengthen civil protection cooperation between EU Member States and participating third countries³ and, in particular, to improve prevention, preparedness, and response to disasters. Countries in and beyond the EU can request emergency assistance through the UCPM, with the Commission coordinating the response. Since 2019, rescEU has complemented the UCPM, serving as a strategic EU-funded reserve of European disaster response capabilities and stockpiles.

In terms of methodology, the impact assessment (IA) stresses from the outset (p. 2) that it follows Tool #9 of the Better Regulation toolbox. This tool governs the law-making process for spending programmes and financial instruments, including the MFF, in accordance with Article 34 and 35 of the EU's Financial Regulation. It allows for a flexible approach to impact assessment, without, however, detailing what this 'specific approach as regards scope and depth of analysis' means in practice. This makes it difficult for EPRS to assess the quality of the IA.

Problem definition

Following reflections on the political and legal context of EU crisis management, including the current funding architecture, the IA recognises that transboundary crisis preparedness is so broad in scope that it cannot be 'addressed by a single instrument or programme alone' (p. 7). It therefore concedes that the proposed instrument will merely 'contribute to resolving the issues and addressing the objectives'. Throughout the IA, crisis management is understood as covering the full cycle from risk awareness, preparedness, prevention and response to recovery (IA, p. 19).

The IA's 'problem definition' section (pp. 7-15) discusses in a seemingly comprehensive manner the hindrances hampering effective EU crisis management in a broad all-hazards context, cutting across different sectors (e.g. public health, critical infrastructure, environmental systems, food security, cybersecurity, civil protection, transport, energy and geopolitics). One of the key messages is that 'none of the major crises during the last years were sufficiently anticipated and prepared for' (IA, p. 8). According to the IA, EU crisis management is fragmented and sector-specific, while strategic foresight and anticipation remain underused. The IA also stresses that, despite the UCPM's multi-hazard approach covering natural and man-made disasters, 'significant gaps remain in anticipating new risks and hazards and in consolidating relevant data across sectors' (IA, p. 8). To illustrate the fragmentation, the IA cites an EU crisis management inventory listing 56 mechanisms, tools and instruments (IA, p. 10), though without properly referencing it. With regard to funding, the IA notes shortcomings in the current EU funding instruments 'over the entire crisis management cycle' owing to 'the diversity of funding sources and varied eligibility rules', and an insufficient strategic alignment of national budgets (IA, pp. 13-15).

The three main problems identified in the IA and their underlying drivers are summed up in the table below. The problem analysis is supported by relevant evidence from desk research, including the Commission's 2024 UCPM evaluation, and illustrated by pertinent examples.

Subsidiarity/proportionality

The IA identifies Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the emergency provision allowing the EU to react swiftly to unfolding crises or supply shortages, Article 196 TFEU (on civil protection), Article 222 TFEU (the solidarity clause in case of terrorist attack, or natural or man-made disaster) and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the mutual defence clause, as legal bases. These are complemented by Articles 6(a) and 168(1) and (5) TFEU to cover health security preparedness and response. On the choice of legal basis, the legislative proposal deviates partially from the IA, suggesting Articles 168(5) and 196 TFEU instead, in combination with Article 322(1) TFEU (providing for the implementation of spending programmes).

In terms of subsidiarity, a distinct section of the IA (Chapter 3 – 'Why should the EU act?') analyses and justifies the necessity of EU action in the area of civil protection. The IA acknowledges the primary responsibility of the Member States in civil protection, crisis prevention and response, with the EU having a supporting competence. In this vein, the IA stresses the overall broad consensus on the added value of coordinated Union-level action in response to transboundary and cross-sectoral crises in cases where the complexity or scale of a crisis overwhelms national capacities. Furthermore, the IA sees a need to enhance EU coordination between civilian bodies and military authorities to prevent duplication of efforts, and to support the preparedness and crisis management capacities of third countries (mainly candidate and neighbouring countries), 'to mitigate crises with wider repercussions on the Union' (IA, p. 87). The IA argues that all this can be better achieved at the EU level than by Member States acting alone.

According to the IA (pp. 17 and 50), the proposed actions (under the preferred policy option) are both proportionate and necessary to achieve the objectives effectively, with due respect for subsidiarity and national competences. This was contested by the French Senate in the form of a reasoned opinion in the framework of national parliaments' subsidiarity check (deadline expiring on 11 November 2025). Aside from concerns regarding compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the French Senate also voiced concerns regarding the broad scope of the initiative (in particular, civil-military cooperation), insisting that any strengthening of preparedness 'must be in line with the division of competences provided for in the Treaties'. In the context of the political dialogue, further contributions were received from the German Bundesrat, the Spanish Cortes General, and the Romanian Senate. The German Bundesrat cautioned that a too-wide interpretation of Article 196 TFEU could, over time, lead to an expansion of EU competence. It also requested that certain elements of the proposed regulation which are currently only stated in recitals be defined in the main body of the legal text, to enhance legal clarity.

Objectives of the initiative

To address the problems identified, the IA puts forward four general objectives, which are, as the IA stresses, aligned with the principles enshrined in the Preparedness Union strategy (March 2025). Like the problem definition section, they draw on a wider concept of preparedness. The objectives contribute to the overarching goal of protecting citizens against crises:

The IA then defines a bundle of specific objectives for each general objective – 19 in total. Their wording, however, could be more specific (e.g. 'contribute to Union policy making, including crisis management, which is guided by risk aware decision making'). This lack of specificity makes progress in implementation hard to measure, a point also raised by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). Moreover, the specific objectives appear to meet the BRG's S.M.A.R.T. criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timebound) only partially. While the specific objectives are not further broken down into more detailed operational objectives, the IA suggests a number of headline indicators for each of the four general objectives for monitoring progress in implementation (see IA, table on pp. 53-54). These are aligned with the performance framework for the post-2027 budget, which is examined in a separate impact assessment (see section on 'Monitoring and evaluation').

According to the IA (p. 73), the initiative supports the achievement of UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) #2 (zero hunger), #3 (good health and well-being), #6 (clean water and sanitation), #11 (sustainable cities and communities) and #13 (climate action).

Range of options considered

Framing the basic requirements for the new crisis management instrument, the IA stipulates that potential policy options 'need to allow for a simple, flexible and integrated budget structure to support Member States with a minimum level of constraints'. At the same time, they need to address prevention and preparedness-related activities, such as anticipation, foresight and capacity development (IA, p. 25).

Before developing the policy options, the IA describes a dynamic baseline scenario. More specifically, it depicts a pre-2026 baseline and a post-2026 baseline, although only the latter appears relevant in view of the fact that the new MFF targets the 2028-2034 period. Under the post-2026 baseline scenario, the IA assumes that Next Generation EU (NGEU) – a temporary stimulus package to assist the post-pandemic economic recovery – would not be extended. Consequently, rescEU stockpiles purchased under NGEU funds would be phased out (only the aerial firefighting capacities would continue to be maintained).⁶ Similarly, the EU4Health programme would no longer be available, as it is set to be phased out after 2027.

Based on this premise, the IA identifies three policy options (POs).

Option 1 puts forward a strengthened sectoral UCPM, which aims to enhance the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) in terms of operational coordination. Response capacities and stockpiles at EU level (in particular RescEU) would remain unchanged. Health emergency response would continue to be financed through a separate programme. Civil-military cooperation in crisis situations within the EU would be conducted on an ad-hoc basis, and mainly for logistics support. Under this option, EU-level action would need to be complemented to a significant extent by the Member States. Consequently, EU response capacities and stockpiles would continue to be limited to the 'traditional' civil protection sector (e.g. medical stockpiles; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) stockpiles; aerial forest firefighting; and shelter).

Option 2 envisages a cross-sectoral UCPM 2.0 incorporating public health security preparedness into the UCPM (currently part of the EU4Health programme) and embedding broad flexibility rules. The UCPM 2.0 is characterised by two working methods, a regular emergency working method and an exceptional crisis working method. Under this option:

According to the IA, PO2 integrates the recommendations of the Commission evaluation of the current UCPM and of serious cross-border health threats (forthcoming), as well as the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors on the EU's response to the COVID-19 pandemic (IA, p. 32).

In contrast to PO1 and 2, PO3 proposes to centralise all preparedness-relevant elements of the entire MFF under a (new) single EU Preparedness Fund within the MFF architecture. This new fund would subsume all preparedness-relevant mechanisms and funding elements for the entire MFF (including preparedness-relevant elements in the National Envelopes, the Competitiveness Fund, and Erasmus+). In terms of fund structure, the various management modes of the programmes (direct, shared and indirect management) would be used within this single Preparedness Fund. However, this option is discarded at an early stage because of (i) its inconsistency with the EU's Preparedness Union strategy; (ii) its increased complexity in financial management due to the combination of direct, indirect and shared management requirements;⁷ and (iii) an amalgamation of different types of competences, both supporting and shared.

This leaves only two options, both seemingly realistic, with PO2 building on PO1. However, PO1 and PO2 are far narrower in scope than the intervention logic set out in the problem definition and objectives sections. Only the discarded PO3 retains the wide and cross-cutting scope of an all-hazard approach, but since it is discarded the IA effectively examines only PO1 and PO2.

Assessment of impacts

The assessment of impacts remains superficial (IA, pp. 37-40), although this should be a core section of any impact assessment. According to the Better Regulation Guidelines, the IA should, 'once a set of policy options is selected, carry out a robust assessment of their economic, social and environmental impacts and of who will be affected and to what degree'. Moreover, it should inform policymakers to what extent the identified policy options meet the objectives, 'with what benefits, at what cost, with what implications for different stakeholders, and at what risk of unintended consequences'. In the present IA, these requirements are at best partially met.

Instead, on a mere three pages, the impacts of PO1 and PO2 are presented in a way that seemingly prejudges them and is geared towards a preferred option, with the conclusions lacking substantiation. For example, the IA states, before any meaningful analysis is carried out, with regard to PO1: 'Thus, the EU added value is not capitalised on.' […] PO1 'misses out on important positive impacts across the environmental, economic and social dimensions' (IA, p. 37). In contrast, the first sentence of the analysis of impacts for PO2 reads: 'Policy Option 2 fully utilises the EU added value and, in doing so, comprehensively achieves the objectives.' This point was also commented on by the RSB, which found the (earlier draft version of the) IA 'not clear enough about the impact of the options and about the differences between them' and noted that 'the choice of preferred option is not sufficiently substantiated'.

While the IA presents some general conclusions on economic impacts, it addresses social and environmental impacts in a cursory manner. The analysis of social impacts is limited to some reflections on population preparedness, which is found to be better under PO2. In terms of environmental impacts, the EU points to PO2 resulting in more successfully preserving natural spaces and biodiversity.

The IA does not analyse budgetary impacts, arguing that 'the impact assessment does not include funding scenarios and, consequently, only qualitative cost benefit analysis is possible' (IA, p. 2). Conversely, the legislative proposal allocates an indicative financial envelope of €10.7 billion to the proposed programme. The initiative is not subject to the 'one-in, one-out' (OIOO) approach, as stated in the IA (p. 72). Similarly, an assessment of the initiative's impact on fundamental rights is not included in the IA (although it is in the explanatory memorandum of the proposal).

Following a (purely qualitative) comparison of PO1 and 2 (IA, pp. 41-49) against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, external coherence, simplification, synergies and the 'ability to act', the IA concludes that PO2 is the preferred option, scoring best across all criteria. An annexed table (IA, p. 89) rates both policy options against the specific objectives that the IA identified, but without elaborating on the assessment method. In this respect, the IA could be more transparent.

Monitoring and evaluation

As mentioned above, in relation to monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the initiative, the IA indicates that it 'will be monitored through the performance framework for the post-2027 budget, which is examined in a separate impact assessment' (IA, p. 51). The performance framework provides for an implementation report during the implementation phase of the programme, and an ex-post evaluation to be carried out in accordance with Article 34(3) of the EU's Financial Regulation. According to the IA, the evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the Better Regulation Guidelines (BRG) and 'will be based on indicators relevant to the objective of the programme' (IA, p. 51) These indicators are set out in the IA itself, in table format, grouped by general objective (IA, pp. 53-54) and they are aligned with the performance framework. They appear to be S.M.A.R.T., specifying clear targets and how the data should be collected.

A key element in the monitoring framework is the mainstreaming of the horizontal principle 'preparedness by design'⁸ (alongside the principles 'do no significant harm' and gender equality). In response to the Commission's UCPM evaluation, a new data repository ('Civil Protection Data Repository') is currently being set up within the Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), to collect operational data (e.g. deployment of capacities and stockpiling locations).

Stakeholder consultation

As required by the BRG, Annex 2 of the IA presents a clear and detailed synopsis report of the stakeholder consultation activities undertaken for the initiative in question. These appear to be limited to a specific open public consultation (OPC) regarding EU funding for civil protection, preparedness and crisis response. No call for evidence was launched, nor would Annex 2 suggest that any targeted consultations took place. Notwithstanding, the explanatory memorandum to the legislative proposal mentions several 'meetings with external stakeholders, experts in civil protection representing Member States' (proposal, p. 6) in recent years having informed the revision of the legal framework.

The questionnaire-based OPC ran from 12 February to 7 May 2025, thus respecting the default 12‑week duration set out in the BRG (Tool #51). It yielded 1 187 responses (two thirds of which came from individual citizens) and 139 position papers (mainly from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), businesses and business organisations). In terms of geographical balance, two thirds of the responses stemmed from only three Member States (France, Belgium and Germany). According to the public consultation, the following issues were perceived as the main risks and threats to Europe: (i) consequences of climate change and natural hazards; (ii) disinformation and cyber-attacks, and the resilience of Europe's digital infrastructure; and (iii) threats to biodiversity and animal and plant health. The synopsis report concludes that, while respondents generally favour EU investments in civil protection, preparedness and stockpiling, they show awareness of gaps in effective preparedness (e.g. outdated critical infrastructure, underfunded health systems, and insufficient coordination between the EU and Member States).

The scope of the questionnaire was, notably, broader than that of the IA; for instance, it considered irregular migration, organised crime and political unrest in the EU's neighbourhood. Where appropriate, for triangulation purposes, the Commission compared the consultation results with the outcome of a recent Eurobarometer survey on civil protection. Stakeholder input is systematically referenced throughout the IA.

For the analysis of the free text answers received from the OPC, the Commission relied on artificial intelligence (AI). More specifically, it applied a large language model (based inter alia on the executive summary of the Niinistö report), and a sentiment analysis model (XLM-RLnews-8) provided by the Joint Research Centre (JRC).

Supporting data and analytical methods used

The IA draws on a wealth of relevant reports and studies, which are transparently referenced throughout the IA report. Several Commission evaluations contribute to the evidence base, with due respect for the 'evaluate first' principle. These include the findings of the UCPM evaluation (2024) and the HERA review (2025) as well as preliminary findings from the upcoming mid-term evaluation of Regulation 2022/2371 on serious cross-border threats to health⁹ and the interim evaluation of the EU4Health programme 2021-2027.¹⁰ Additionally, the IA indicates that it has included important preliminary findings from the UCPM capacity gaps report, which came out in June 2025, shortly before the IA.

Annex 4 of the IA, entitled 'analytical methods' (p. 74) is supposed to explain the methods used and could thus be more detailed. Effectively, it is limited to a list of information sources used, including:

The evidence was 'qualitatively analysed', as the IA states (p. 74), and indeed, quantitative data appear largely absent from the evidence base. In terms of methodology, the IA acknowledges that 'deficits with regards to the cost-benefit analysis of interventions due to the volatile response environment and the impossibility of counter-factual analyses persist' (p. 55).

Follow-up to Commission Regulatory Scrutiny Board opinion

Following the submission of a draft version of the IA on 28 May 2025, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) issued a profoundly critical opinion on 18 June 2025, which identified a number of 'significant shortcomings'. Remarkably, and 'exceptionally', the Board refrained from giving a qualification (i.e. 'positive', 'positive with reservations' or 'negative', as set out in BRG Tool #3) to the opinion. This absence of quality scoring concerns all seven MFF-related IAs that the Commission released between July and September 2025.

While the Board acknowledged the applicability of BRG Tool #9 for the preparation of a new MFF, it nonetheless found that the draft IA was lacking 'several key elements' across all sections. In particular, the RSB noted a lack of clarity in the scope definition and in the programme's interaction with other funding programmes within the MFF architecture; flaws in the intervention logic; and the proposed objectives not being S.M.A.R.T. Moreover, it found that the draft IA was 'not clear enough about the impact of the options and about the differences between them', arguing further that the 'choice of preferred option is not sufficiently substantiated'. The Board also posed questions regarding the governance mechanism and the monitoring and evaluation framework. It concluded that the IA report needed to be revised before proceeding with the file.

The final IA (pp. 54-55) provides a brief explanation of how the RSB comments have been dealt with. Certain recommendations have been taken on board, resulting, for instance, in more clarity to the description of the coherence chapter and the monitoring framework. However, given the persisting shortcomings in the final IA (discussed also in this briefing), it appears that some RSB recommendations have only been partially addressed.

Coherence between the Commission's legislative proposal and IA

The proposed regulation appears to be coherent with the preferred policy option (PO2). However, two deviations are worth mentioning. As stated above, the proposal departs from the IA in the choice of legal basis. Furthermore, the IA does not analyse budgetary impacts, arguing that 'the impact assessment does not include funding scenarios'. The proposed regulation provides for a budgetary ceiling of €10.6 billion for crisis management for the MFF period 2028-2034 (which is roughly three times the size of the allocated resources under the current UCPM).

This briefing, prepared for the ENVI and SANT committees, analyses whether the principal criteria laid down in the Commission's own Better Regulation Guidelines, as well as additional factors identified by the Parliament in its Impact Assessment Handbook, appear to be met by the IA. It does not attempt to deal with the substance of the proposal.