Association with the EU
Summary
Association with the EU is not a predetermined status but one that depends on the negotiations and the resulting agreement between the EU and a third country or international organisation. Association agreements (AAs) are flexible instruments, allowing for varying degrees of integration with third countries. The possibility of closer integration was raised by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her announcement before the European Parliament on 15 September 2026 of a possible 'associate membership' for Canada. The conclusions of the EU‑Canada summit, held in Ottawa on 29‑30 October 2026, mention an 'ever closer association (…) short of full membership' between Canada and the EU.
Under Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), AAs establish privileged relationships involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure. They are international treaties concluded by the EU under the specific competence conferred by Article 217 TFEU, in accordance with the procedural requirements of Article 218 TFEU. They are frequently concluded as mixed agreements, involving both the EU and its Member States as contracting parties. Historically, AAs have served various purposes: preparing countries for accession, offering durable integration without membership, and organising cooperation with partners outside Europe.
The substantive scope of AAs also varies greatly. They may be used to provide extensive participation in the internal market (e.g. the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), establish a customs union for goods (e.g. the EU–Turkey Agreement) or liberalise trade in specific areas (e.g. the AA with Morocco). The EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which governs post‑Brexit relations with the United Kingdom, demonstrates that an agreement may cover a particularly wide range of policies while stopping short of internal market participation.
Association agreements may also confer rights on individuals through provisions that may, if the necessary conditions are met, have direct effect. The institutional and procedural mechanisms for interpretation, application, enforcement and dispute resolution differ greatly between AAs. They may include joint association councils, arbitration or special judicial mechanisms, as in the case of the EEA's two‑pillar judicial system based on the cooperation between the Court of Justice of the EU and the EFTA Court.
Introduction
Association with the EU is not a predetermined status but one that depends on the negotiations and the resulting agreement between the EU and a third country or international organisation. Depending on the agreement, a minimal or a very high degree of integration with the third country can be achieved. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen mentioned, in her state of the Union address on 15 September 2026, a possible 'associate membership' for Canada, and the conclusions of the EU‑Canada summit held on 29‑30 October 2026 contain a commitment to 'work to define by the 2027 Canada‑EU Summit the concept of an ever‑closer association of Canada to the EU, short of full membership itself'.
Association agreements (AAs), provided for in Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), are international treaties that the EU may enter into with third countries and international organisations. AAs 'play a fundamental role in the Union's external policy', in particular by 'simplif[ying] access to the [EU] market for goods from the countries concerned and, at the same time, commit[ting] the [EU] to cooperate with them economically and financially'.1
The practice of applying Article 217 TFEU as a legal basis for international agreements reveals a number of political and economic functions of AAs. Van Elsuwege and Chamon distinguish three principal functions: (1) preparation for EU accession; (2) provision of an alternative to EU membership; and (3) establishment of privileged relations with non‑European countries. This typology reflects the objectives of association rather than distinct legal forms, and the function of an agreement may evolve over time.
Friedrich Erlbacher, in turn, distinguishes three functions of AAs: (1) establishment of 'privileged long‑term economic and geopolitical links with specific countries in the EU neighbourhood'; (2) preparation for accession; and (3) arrangements with former EU Member States (the UK after Brexit).2
Legal basis for association in the EU Treaties and the concept of association
Article 217 TFEU as the basis for association agreements
The legal basis for association with the EU is laid down in Article 217 TFEU, which provides that: 'The Union may conclude with one or more third countries or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.' Association therefore constitutes a specific form of treaty‑based relationship between the EU and one or more third countries or international organisations, characterised by three distinct features: 1) reciprocal rights and obligations; 2) common action; and 3) special procedure.
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has stated that 'an association agreement creat[es] special, privileged links with a non‑member country which must, at least to a certain extent, take part in the [EU] system' (Case 12/86, Demirel, para 9). Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel characterise association as a form of close involvement in the EU's operations.3 Article 217 TFEU leaves the EU institutions a broad margin of discretion regarding both the content of possible AAs and the countries or organisations to be associated with the EU.4
From the perspective of public international law, an AA is an international treaty, and the legal ties between the EU and the other contracting parties to the AA are based on that treaty, rather than directly on the EU Treaties. The associated country or organisation does not become an EU Member State or acquire observer status by virtue of the AA. As Jan Wouters noted, 'The Treaties are built on a binary distinction between Member States and third countries. Membership is acquired only through Article 49 TEU [Treaty on European Union] and lost only through Article 50 TEU; there is no intermediate category.'5 Although AAs may be used as a pathway to EU membership or as an alternative to such membership, the purposes for which AAs are concluded vary greatly. EU accession is governed by a different set of rules (e.g. Article 49 TEU), and an AA may be entered into by a country that does not seek EU membership or is not eligible for it (e.g. because of its geographical location). From the perspective of the EU legal order, an AA is an integral part of EU law and is binding on the EU and its Member States (Case 181/73, Haegeman, paras 3‑6).
The legal classification of an international agreement concluded by the EU as an AA depends on the substantive legal basis invoked in the Council act concluding it. That legal basis must be determined in accordance with the agreement's aims and content.6 Indeed, not all comprehensive trade agreements are AAs. For example, the EU–Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (2017), notwithstanding its broad material scope, was concluded on the basis of Article 37 TEU and Articles 91, 100(2), 207 and 209 TFEU, together with the applicable procedural provisions of Article 218 TFEU, but not Article 217 TFEU (see Council Decision (EU) 2021/270).
The legal classification of an agreement as an AA is relevant because its conclusion requires the European Parliament's consent (although this requirement also applies to trade agreements and is therefore not a distinctive trait of AAs). In addition, Article 217 TFEU, as the substantive legal basis for AAs, provides one of the benchmarks against which the CJEU may review the agreement's conformity with EU law.
Finally, association with the EU under Article 217 TFEU must be distinguished from the association of the overseas countries and territories of Denmark, France and the Netherlands, provided for in Articles 198‑204 TFEU. These countries and territories, which are not sovereign states, are associated with the EU by virtue of the relevant TFEU articles, rather than through AAs under Article 217 TFEU.
General competence to conclude international agreements by the EU: Articles 216 and 218 TFEU
Article 216(1) TFEU sets out the general conditions under which the EU may conclude international agreements, including where the Treaties provide so expressly. Article 217 TFEU provides one such express competence and thereby constitutes a substantive legal basis. Article 218 TFEU is of a procedural nature: it governs the negotiation, signature and conclusion of international agreements, and is therefore primarily a procedural provision rather than an independent substantive legal basis.
In particular, the conclusion of AAs pursuant to Article 218 TFEU requires the consent of the European Parliament (Article 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU), and unanimous adoption of the decision concluding the agreement by the Council (Article 218(8) TFEU). Once concluded, international agreements are binding on the institutions of the Union and the Member States (Article 216(2) TFEU).
Other provisions in the EU Treaties allowing the EU to conclude international agreements
Article 217 TFEU is one of several provisions expressly addressing the conclusion of international agreements in particular areas or situations. Other examples are Article 8(2) TEU (agreements with neighbouring countries), Article 79(3) TFEU (immigration and readmission) and Article 207 TFEU (tariff and trade agreements).
As mentioned above, the choice of one or more substantive legal bases for the Council decision concluding an international agreement must be determined by the agreement's purpose and content (Case C-263/14, Parliament v Council, para 43). Where an agreement pursues several objectives or contains several components, the decision must normally rely on the legal basis corresponding to its predominant objective or component, without additional legal bases for merely incidental elements (Case C-263/14, Parliament v Council, para 44). Exceptionally, several legal bases must be combined where the objectives or components are inextricably linked and none is incidental to another, provided that the procedures prescribed by those legal bases are compatible (Case C-180/20, Commission v Council (Agreement with Armenia), para 34). Indeed, the combination of two legal bases would not be possible if the procedures laid down for each legal basis are incompatible with one another (ibid.). However, the inclusion of provisions concerning several policy areas does not automatically require additional substantive legal bases alongside Article 217 TFEU, whose broad scope allows those provisions to form part of the agreement's overarching association objective (Case C-479/21 PPU, Governor of Cloverhill Prison, paras 63‑67).
The most significant potential overlap concerns agreements with neighbouring countries as provided for in Article 8 TEU. That article requires the EU to develop a special relationship with its neighbours, with the objective of establishing 'an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness', founded on EU values and peaceful cooperation. It permits the conclusion of 'specific agreements', which may entail reciprocal rights and obligations and joint activities, with provision for periodic consultation on their implementation.
Articles 217 TFEU and 8 TEU differ in both scope and purpose. Article 217 TFEU allows AAs with third countries or international organisations generally, whereas Article 8 TEU concerns only neighbouring countries and pursues the more specific objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Thus, agreements with neighbouring countries need not be AAs under Article 217 TFEU: depending on their purpose and content, they may instead be concluded on other substantive legal bases. For example, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia was concluded on the basis of Article 37 TEU and Articles 91, 100(2), 207 and 209 TFEU (Council Decision (EU) 2021/270), while the former Interim Agreement on trade and trade‑related matters with Lebanon was concluded on the basis of Article 133 EC, the predecessor of Article 207 TFEU on the common commercial policy (Council Decision 2002/761/EC).
Mixity of association agreements and their provisional application
Association agreements are frequently concluded as mixed agreements, involving both the EU and its Member States as contracting parties. Mixity may be required where the agreement encompasses matters falling outside EU competence, but may also result from a political choice to involve the Member States in areas of shared competence. Most notably, whereas the common commercial policy and customs union are exclusive EU competences, the internal market and competition remain shared competences, in which Member States still establish legal rules within their competences.
Two examples of AAs that were not concluded as mixed agreements are the EU–Kosovo Agreement, which was concluded by the EU alone, as not all Member States recognise Kosovo(*)7 as a sovereign state, and the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 2020.8
Because all Member States must ratify a mixed agreement as contracting parties, its entry into force may take several years. For instance, the EU–Bosnia and Herzegovina Agreement took seven years to be ratified.9 Consequently, AAs, concluded as mixed agreements, may be provisionally applied pending their entry into force, just like other mixed agreements.10 Provisional application pending ratification is provided for in general international law and within EU law in Article 218(5) TFEU.11
Multilateral agreements may make entry into force conditional on a specified threshold of ratifications. For example, Article 93(3) of the Cotonou Agreement required the deposit of instruments of ratification by all EU Member States and at least two‑thirds of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States, together with the European Community's instrument of approval. Similarly, Article 98(2) of the Samoa Agreement requires the EU, its Member States and at least two‑thirds of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS, the successor to the ACP Group of States) to complete their internal procedures and deposit instruments expressing their consent to be bound.
Provisional application may nevertheless begin before those conditions are fulfilled, where the AA itself so provides. For instance, the Samoa Agreement has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2024, within the scope specified by Council Decision (EU) 2023/2861. Such application operates between consenting participants within the agreed scope, but does not itself satisfy or waive the conditions for definitive entry into force.
Parties eligible for association with the EU
Entities eligible to conclude an AA with the EU include not only sovereign states but also territorial entities that are not internationally recognised as sovereign states or whose status is internationally disputed,12 as well as international organisations. Article 217 TFEU does not specify which categories of countries are eligible for association and the 'policy of association is hence left to the discretion of the EU institutions when concluding such agreements'.13
Although Article 217 TFEU expressly authorises the conclusion of AAs with international organisations, this possibility appears to have been used only to a limited extent. AAs have predominantly been concluded with individual third countries or groups of countries. Notably, the Samoa Agreement was concluded pursuant to Article 217 TFEU with the member states of the OACPS, rather than with the organisation itself. Conversely, the EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA), signed in 2026, expressly includes Mercosur as a contracting party, but the Council decision authorising its signature does not invoke Article 217 TFEU. Therefore, the EMPA is not an AA.
General procedural framework
The general procedure for concluding international agreements, laid down in Article 218 TFEU, must be followed for AAs because Article 217 TFEU provides the substantive legal basis for AAs but does not provide for any specific procedure departing from what is generally applicable to international agreements.
The Council must authorise the opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, authorise the signing of agreements and conclude them (Article 218(2) TFEU). An AA is typically negotiated by the Commission as the sole negotiator (or jointly with the High Representative), in accordance with directives issued by the Council14 (Article 218(3) and (4) TFEU). The decision to conclude the AA is adopted by the Council on a proposal from the Commission as negotiator, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament (Article 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU. The Council must act unanimously (Article 218(8) TFEU).
Parliament's specific role in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements is also addressed in the Parliament–Commission Framework Agreement on relations between the two institutions. It requires the Commission to provide Parliament with comprehensive and timely information 'at all stages' of the negotiation process, sufficiently in advance to allow Parliament to express its views, where possible, and to enable the Commission to consider Parliament's positions to the greatest extent possible.
Moreover, the Framework Agreement r einforces Parliament's role in negotiations and meetings concerning international agreements by allowing a delegation of Members of the European Parliament to serve as observers within EU delegations. When the Commission intends to propose the provisional application of an international agreement to the Council, it is required to inform Parliament at the earliest opportunity and provide its reasons for this proposal.15
Legal consequences of association agreements: Material scope and individual rights
Diversity of the material scope of AAs
The o pen‑ended wording of Article 217 TFEU allows the EU to make commitments under AAs on any subject matter falling within its competence.16 Individual AAs differ both in their substantive policy scope and the depth of economic and regulatory cooperation. They may provide for, among others:
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a free trade area (e.g. EU–Morocco, EU–Kosovo, EU–UK TCA), involving preferential tariff liberalisation, while the EU and the associated country retain separate external tariffs;
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a customs union (e.g. EU–Turkey), entailing the free circulation of covered goods, with alignment with the EU common external tariff and specified trade rules;
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different degrees of participation in the EU's internal market ( e.g. the EEA) – covering the four market freedoms (free movement of persons, goods, capital and services), competition and State aid regulatory regimes, and extensive incorporation of EU legislation, but not participation in the customs union.
The EEA Agreement represents the broadest AA in terms of scope, as it covers the free movement of goods, workers, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment, alongside extensive incorporation of EU rules on State aid and competition law. The EEA Agreement nevertheless does not cover the EU customs union or common commercial policy. The EEA EFTA states therefore retain external trade policies distinct from the EU's, while preferential tariff treatment for goods traded between the EU and those states remains conditional on compliance with the applicable rules of origin (Article 9 and Protocol 4 to the EEA Agreement).17
The EU–Turkey (Ankara) Agreement envisages, in Article 2, a customs union, whose final phase was implemented through Association Council Decision No 1/95 from 1996. The customs union principally covers industrial products, requiring the removal of customs barriers and Türkiye's alignment with the EU common external tariff and specified competition, commercial policy and technical rules. Agricultural products and coal and steel are subject to separate arrangements. Although Articles 12‑14 of the Ankara Agreement envisage progress concerning workers, establishment and services, the association does not establish the four internal market freedoms as the EEA does.
The EU–Morocco Association Agreement provides for a free trade area (Article 6), including liberalisation of trade in industrial products (Articles 7‑14) and special arrangements for agricultural and fishery products (Articles 15‑18). It also addresses competition policy (Article 36), economic cooperation and social and cultural matters (Titles V‑VI); further liberalisation of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services is envisaged for the future rather than generally granted (Article 31).
The EU–Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement provides for the progressive establishment of a free trade area in goods (Articles 20‑35), alongside differentiated commitments on establishment, services and capital, legislative approximation and cooperation across a wide range of policies. Neither framework confers general participation in the EU internal market.
The EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which governs post‑Brexit EU‑UK relations, is exceptionally broad in its policy scope but, unlike the EEA, does not provide for internal market participation. Its trade provisions eliminate customs duties on goods originating in either the UK or the EU (Article 21), while other provisions address services and investment, digital trade, procurement, energy, transport, fisheries, social security coordination, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (principally Parts Two and Three). The TCA does not establish general free movement of persons; its services and investment provisions exclude general labour market access and permanent residence (Article 123(3)).
Conferral of rights on individuals and their direct effect
Association agreements may confer rights on individuals, but the direct effect of their provisions must be assessed on a provision‑by‑provision basis. A provision has direct effect where, having regard to its wording and to the purpose and nature of the agreement, it contains a clear and precise obligation whose implementation or effects are not conditional on the adoption of subsequent measures (Case 12/86, Demirel, para 14). Individuals may therefore invoke qualifying provisions before national courts without awaiting further implementing measures.
For example, the agreements with Morocco (Articles 64(1) and 65(1)), Tunisia (Articles 64(1) and 65(1)) and Algeria (Articles 67(1) and 68(1)) prohibit, within their respective scopes, discrimination on grounds of nationality in working conditions, remuneration, dismissal and social security. The Court has recognised the direct effect of the Moroccan agreement's social security non‑discrimination provision (Case C‑336/05, Echouikh, paras 39‑42) and the Tunisian agreement's employment non‑discrimination provision (Case C‑97/05, Gattoussi, paras 25‑28). It has also recognised the direct effect of Article 68(4) of the Algerian agreement, concerning the transfer to Algeria of specified pensions and annuities (Case C‑549/22, Sociale verzekeringsbank, paras 30‑36).
Under the EU–Turkey association, Article 10(1) of Association Council Decision No 1/80 prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality in remuneration and other working conditions and has direct effect (Case C‑171/01, Wählergruppe Gemeinsam, paras 54‑67), while Articles 6(1) and 7 confer progressively acquired employment rights on qualifying Turkish workers and family members and are likewise directly effective (Case C‑192/89, Sevince, para 26; Case C‑351/95, Kadiman, para 28). Article 3(1) of Association Council Decision No 3/80 similarly establishes a directly effective principle of equal treatment within that decision's social security regime (Case C‑262/96, Sürül, para 74).
Interpretation, application, dispute resolution
Association agreements generally establish joint institutions, typically known as Association Councils, empowered to supervise their implementation and settle disputes concerning their interpretation or application.
The allocation of judicial and arbitral authority varies considerably.
The EEA Agreement establishes a two‑pillar system of judicial supervision, comprising the EU pillar and the EFTA pillar. Within the EU pillar, the European Commission monitors compliance with EEA obligations, while the CJEU exercises its ordinary jurisdiction under the EU Treaties, including interpreting the EEA Agreement through preliminary rulings (Article 267 TFEU) and ruling on infringement actions against Member States (Article 258 TFEU).
Within the EFTA pillar, corresponding functions are performed by two separate institutions: the EFTA Surveillance Authority, responsible for monitoring compliance by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and the EFTA Court, established pursuant to Article 108 of the EEA Agreement and the EFTA Surveillance and Court Agreement (SCA). The EFTA Court has jurisdiction, inter alia, over infringement proceedings brought by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (Article 31 SCA), actions challenging decisions of that Authority (Article 36 SCA), and requests from national courts of EFTA States for advisory opinions concerning the interpretation of EEA law (Article 34 SCA).
The EFTA Court and the CJEU thus exercise jurisdiction within their respective pillars , with neither acting as a court of appeal for the other. Nevertheless, the EEA Agreement seeks to secure homogeneous interpretation through Article 6, which requires EEA provisions corresponding to EU provisions to be interpreted in conformity with relevant CJEU case law predating the agreement's signature, and Articles 105‑106, which establish mechanisms for monitoring and addressing divergences between the case law of the two courts. Furthermore, Article 3(2) SCA requires the EFTA Court to take due account of relevant CJEU case law delivered after the signature of the EEA Agreement.
Other AAs provide for different mechanisms of judicial and arbitral dispute settlement. Under the Ankara Agreement, disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Agreement may be submitted to the Association Council, which may either settle them by a binding decision or refer them to the CJEU or another existing court or tribunal (Article 25(1)‑(3)). However, since the Association Council acts unanimously (Article 23), referral to a judicial body requires the consent of both parties. Article 25(4) further envisages the establishment of arbitral procedures, while Association Council Decision No 1/95 provides for binding arbitration concerning certain disputes over protection, safeguard and rebalancing measures (Articles 61‑62).
Under the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, general disputes concerning interpretation or application are referred to the Association Council, which may settle them by binding decisions (Articles 476‑477), whereas trade‑related disputes are subject to a separate mechanism of binding arbitration (Articles 303‑326). Arbitration panels are constituted for individual disputes, and their rulings are binding on the parties (Article 321(2)). Importantly, where a dispute raises a question concerning the interpretation of EU law within the areas specified in Article 322(1), the arbitral panel must refer that question to the CJEU, whose ruling is binding on the panel (Article 322(2)). Thus, the CJEU retains authority over the interpretation of relevant EU law provisions, while the arbitral panel remains responsible for resolving the dispute under the Agreement.
The EU–Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement (EU–Kosovo SAA) likewise provides for the settlement of disputes by the Stabilisation and Association Council, which may adopt binding decisions (Article 136(3) of the SAA). Where a dispute remains unresolved for two months, either party may initiate arbitration, but only concerning matters falling within the material scope of Protocol V (Article 137(4) of the SAA and Article 2 of Protocol V). Arbitral panels are composed of three arbitrators (Article 4(1) of Protocol V), and their rulings are binding on the parties (Article 14(2) of Protocol V). However, unlike the Ukraine Agreement, the Kosovo SAA does not provide for referrals to the CJEU; on the contrary, Protocol V expressly prohibits arbitral panels from interpreting the EU acquis (Article 13 of Protocol V). Disputes concerning the agreement's interpretation or application may be addressed through consultations within the Stabilisation and Association Council, which may settle them by binding decision (Articles 136(3) and 137 of the SAA).
Under the EU–Morocco Association Agreement, either party may refer disputes concerning interpretation or application to the Association Council, which may resolve them by decision (Article 86(1)–(3)). If no settlement is reached, either party may initiate arbitration before a three‑member tribunal, whose decisions the parties must implement (Article 86(4)). This framework was supplemented by the 2011 EU–Morocco Dispute Settlement Agreement, which establishes a more detailed arbitral mechanism for specified trade‑related disputes (particularly Articles 2, 5‑6 and 9).
Finally, the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement establishes a Partnership Council responsible for supervising the Agreement and empowered to adopt binding decisions (Articles 7 and 10), alongside a separate dispute‑settlement mechanism based on consultations and arbitration (Articles 734‑762). For disputes falling within the scope of this mechanism, either party may request the establishment of a three‑member arbitral tribunal following unsuccessful consultations (Articles 738‑740). Its rulings are binding on the EU and the UK (Article 754(2)), while Article 754(5) expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the parties' courts to resolve disputes between them under the Agreement. Unlike the Ukraine Agreement, the TCA does not provide for a general mechanism of referral to the CJEU. Its dispute‑settlement system thus rests principally on international arbitration rather than supranational judicial interpretation.
The establishment of judicial and arbitral mechanisms under AAs is subject to the requirement to preserve the autonomy of the EU legal order, particularly the CJEU's authority to interpret EU law. This principle was developed in two opinions concerning the proposed EEA Agreement. In its Opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991, the CJEU found that the initially envisaged judicial system, involving a common EEA Court composed partly of CJEU judges, was incompatible with the EEC Treaty. In particular, the proposed arrangements risked allowing an external court to give interpretations affecting the meaning of corresponding provisions of Community law and to interfere with the allocation of competences between the Community and its Member States, thereby undermining the autonomy of the Community legal order.
Following a revision of the proposed institutional arrangements, the CJEU, in its Opinion 1/92 of 10 April 1992, found the new system compatible with the EEC Treaty. The revised arrangements established a separate EFTA Court and safeguards ensuring that the mechanisms for homogeneous interpretation and dispute settlement would not affect the binding authority of CJEU case law within the Community legal order.
Terminating, suspending and amending association agreements
The termination, suspension and amendment of AAs are governed by the generally applicable rules and principles of international law, subject to any specific provisions of the agreements themselves. The relevant rules are reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), particularly Articles 39‑41 (amendment), 54‑56 (termination and withdrawal), 57 (suspension), 60 (material breach) and 62 (fundamental change of circumstances). Although the VCLT does not apply as such to treaties concluded by international organisations, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations of 21 March 1986 has not yet entered into force, the relevant rules are binding on the EU insofar as they reflect customary international law (Case C-162/96, Racke, paras 45‑53).
Association agreements frequently contain express provisions governing unilateral termination or withdrawal. Article 127 of the EEA Agreement allows any contracting party to withdraw upon giving at least 12 months' written notice and requires the remaining parties to convene a diplomatic conference to consider the necessary modifications to the Agreement. Article 481(2) of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, Article 427(2) of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, Article 460(2) of the EU–Moldova Association Agreement, Article 93 of the EU–Morocco Association Agreement and Article 140 of the EU–Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement all provide for unilateral denunciation, with termination taking effect six months after notification or its receipt, as specified in the respective agreements.
Under Article 779 of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, either party may terminate the Agreement by written notification through diplomatic channels, whereupon the TCA and any supplementing agreement cease to be in force on the first day of the twelfth month following notification.
Some AAs establish special suspension mechanisms, particularly for breaches of their essential elements. For example, Article 140 of the EU–Kosovo SAA authorises either party to suspend the agreement, wholly or partially and with immediate effect, in the event of non‑compliance with an essential element; it also specifically permits the EU to take appropriate measures, including suspension, where Kosovo fails to comply with the essential principles set out in Articles 5 and 13 of the SAA. Similarly, Article 772 of the TCA permits suspension or termination, in whole or in part, following a serious and substantial failure to fulfil obligations identified as essential elements in Article 771 of the TCA, subject to consultations and requirements of proportionality.
Substantive amendments to AAs may be agreed through additional protocols or separate international agreements, subject to the consent of the parties and to their applicable constitutional procedures. For example, the EEC–Turkey association framework was substantially developed through the Additional Protocol signed in 1970, while Article 30 of the Ankara Agreement provides that protocols agreed by the contracting parties and annexed to the Agreement form an integral part of it.
However, many AAs also establish simplified mechanisms allowing their joint institutions to amend specified provisions or annexes without concluding a new international agreement. Under Article 98 of the EEA Agreement, the EEA Joint Committee may amend designated annexes and protocols, notably to incorporate new EU legislation, in accordance with the procedures established by Articles 102‑103 of that agreement. Similarly, Article 463(3) of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement empowers the Association Council to update or amend the agreement's annexes, taking account of developments in EU law and relevant international standards.
Within the EU legal order, amendment and suspension are additionally subject to the procedural requirements of Article 218 TFEU. Article 218(7) TFEU permits the Council, when concluding an agreement, to authorise the negotiator to approve subsequent modifications on behalf of the Union where the agreement provides for a simplified amendment procedure or amendment by a body established under it. Article 218(9) TFEU governs Council decisions suspending the application of agreements and establishing EU positions in treaty bodies adopting acts having legal effects, excluding acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement.
Where an amendment requires the conclusion of a new international agreement, the ordinary procedures of Article 218 TFEU apply, including Parliament's consent where required under Article 218(6)(a) TFEU. Article 218(8) TFEU provides for unanimity in the Council in respect of AAs. Where an agreement is mixed, the participation of Member States in amendment or termination procedures must also be considered in accordance with the division of competences and the applicable national constitutional requirements.
Association agreements under Article 217 TFEU and its predecessors: Historical development and current practice
The practice of concluding AAs under Article 217 TFEU and its predecessors18 extends over six decades and spans several distinct geographical and political contexts.
The earliest agreements were the EEC–Greece AA (1961) followed by the first Yaoundé Convention (1963) with 18 African and Malagasy states, and then by the EEC–Turkey AA (1963), which is still in force. AAs with Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972) followed.
AAs with non‑European countries include the second Yaoundé Convention (1969),19 followed by the four Lomé Conventions of 1975, 1979, 1984 and 1989.20
The Lomé system was subsequently replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000).21 The EU–OACPS Partnership Agreement (Samoa Agreement) was signed on 15 November 2023 and has provisionally applied since 1 January 2024 (see Council Decision (EU) 2023/2861).
Following the dissolution of COMECON in 1991, the European Communities and their Member States signed 10 AAs known as 'Europe Agreements' with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: Hungary (1991), Poland (1991), Romania (1993), Bulgaria (1993), the Czech Republic (1993), Slovakia (1993), Estonia (1995), Latvia (1995), Lithuania (1995) and Slovenia (1996). These AAs combined trade liberalisation, political dialogue and legislative approximation, becoming central instruments of pre‑accession integration. They ceased to govern the countries' relations with the EU upon their accession in 2004 or 2007. A different model was established by the EEA Agreement (1992), providing extensive participation in the internal market without EU membership.
From the mid‑1990s, association became an important instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. A new generation of Euro‑Mediterranean AAs was concluded with Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Lebanon. These agreements combined preferential trade relations with political dialogue and economic cooperation.
In the Western Balkans (former Yugoslavia), the EU subsequently concluded stabilisation and association agreements with North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. They link economic integration and legislative approximation with democratic and institutional reforms, regional cooperation and the prospect of eventual EU membership.
During the 21st century, association has also been employed beyond the EU's immediate neighbourhood. Examples include the EU–South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement, the EU–Chile Association Agreement (2002) and the EU–Central America Association Agreement (2012). A particularly far‑reaching form of regulatory integration was subsequently established through the AAs with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, all signed in 2014 and incorporating deep and comprehensive free‑trade areas.
More recently, Article 217 TFEU provided the substantive legal basis for the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020), demonstrating that association can also structure relations with a former Member State without providing for participation in the internal market comparable to that under the EEA Agreement.
A different, more selective model is represented by bilateral EU–Swiss relations . In 1999, seven sectoral agreements were signed ( Bilaterals I ), including the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. This package was treated, on the EU side, as an association arrangement, since Council and Commission Decision 2002/309/EC, Euratom, approving the agreements, expressly invoked Article 310 TEC (now Article 217 TFEU). A second package, known as Bilaterals II , was signed in 2004, covering additional areas of cooperation, including Switzerland's association with the Schengen and Dublin systems.
On 2 March 2026, the EU and Switzerland signed the main components of a third package, known as Bilaterals III , following the Council's authorisation of 24 February 2026 (Decision (EU) 2026/792), which expressly invoked Article 217 TFEU. The new package aims to consolidate and deepen existing sectoral integration, introduce common institutional arrangements and extend cooperation to additional areas, including electricity, food safety and health.
An EU-UK association agreement concerning Gibraltar was signed on 1 July 2026 and has been provisionally applied since 15 July 2026. On 19 October 2026, AAs were signed with Andorra and San Marino.
Main references
- Van Elsuwege, P., Chamon, M., The Meaning of 'Association' under EU Law – A Study on the Law and Practice of EU Association Agreements, Study for the AFCO committee, 2019.
- Mańko, R., European Court of Justice and international agreements, EPRS, European Parliament, 2021.
- Mańko, R., The European Parliament's role in concluding international agreements, EPRS, European Parliament, 2024.
- Mańko, R., Judicial review of international agreements by the Court of Justice of the EU, EPRS, European Parliament, March 2026.
Endnotes
Classification
Policy areas: Public International Law
Committees: Foreign Affairs (AFET), Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)
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